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SEX IS NOT A SPORT: CONSENT AND
VIOLENCE IN CRIMINAL LAW
CHERYL HANNA*
Abstract: Does consent excuse violence against another? Generally, it
does not. Recently, however, criminal defendants charged with violence
against their sexual partners have asked courts to treat violent sex or
sadomasochism (S/M) as a sport, like prize fighting and hockey. While
Most courts have refused to do so, a recent New York case, People v.
jovanovic, let stand a ruling that effectively permits a defendant to argue
consent as a defense. This Article argues that the liberal argument
treating S/M as a matter of sexual autonomy fails to account adequately
for the history and practical application of the doctrine of violent
consent. It concludes that by recognizing consent in the S/M context,
the law is evolving in a direction that could lead to the glorification of
sexual violence, rather than the sexual liberation of consenting adults.
We are in bondage to the law so that we may remain free.
—Marcus Tullius Cicero
INTRODUCTION: IN BONDAGE TO THE LAW
In sadomasochism,' sex and violence intersect, becoming inter-
twined and indistinguishable. Americans are fascinated with S/M, in
* Professor of Law, Vermont Law School, Visiting Professor of Law, University of Cali-
fornia, Hastings College of the Law, 2000-2001. J.D., Harvard Law School, B.A., Kalama-
zoo College. I would like to thank Jennifer Burkhardt, Amy Rose, and Tia McClure for
their research assistance on this piece. It was a hard and emotional project on which to
work, and I deeply appreciate their thoughtfulness and good humor. I would also like to
thank David Faigman, Evan Lee, Aaron Rappaport, Reuel Schiller, Randika Rao, Joel Paul,
Roger Park, and Kate Bloch for their comments, suggestions, and unwavering support. I
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I The term sadomasochism (S/M) derives from the work of two novelists: Marquis tie
Sade and Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, both of whom explored in their writings the bonds
of violent sexual relationships. Sadomasochism, which is sometimes referred to as bondage
and domination, or bondage and discipline (B/D), is a sexual practice whereby a person
experiences erotic pleasure though either inflicting pain (sadism) or receiving pain
(masochism). THOMAS E. MURRAY & THOMAS R. MURRELL, THE LANGUAGE Or SADOMASO-
CHISM 20-21 (1989).
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part, because we are a culture fascinated with bonds and boundaries
of pain and pleasure and with the ambiguity of power and powerless-
ness in intimate relationships. S/M is at "once pain and the opposite
of pain."2 In S/M, bondage, role-playing, spanking, beatings, physical
and verbal torture, and humiliation are the means to a cathartic
end—the knowledge and acceptance that one person has total and
complete control over the others In the "eroticism of suffering,"
pleasure and pain are not mutually exclusive, but rather they are "in-
timately linked."4 S/M is, by definition, consensual activity, 5 yet it
pushes at the edge of legal consent.6
S/M involves not only the law of sexual consent, 7 but also the law
of violent consent. Sex and violence are separate and distinct paths
within criminal law, however, and at their crossroads, the doctrine of
consent becomes confused and confusing. Violence, like sex, is both
terrorizing and titillating, depending on the context. Whether S/M is
a context in which individual sexual autonomy should overpower the
state's interest in restraining violence is the subject of this Article.
Consensual sexual violence runs the spectrum from playful
pushing and wrestling to erotic asphyxiation. On one end of the spec-
trum, consensual activities that could result in nothing more than a
"transient and trifling injury" are generally no concern of the crimi-
2 `falai Asad, On Torture, or Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment, 63 Soc. RES. 1081
(1906), available at 1996 WI, 13224679 (1996).
3 See Marianne Apostolides, The Pleasure of Pain: Why Some People Need S & M, PSYCHOL.
TODAY, Sept. 1, 1999, at 60.
4 Asad, supra note 2.
5 See, e.g., GLORIA G. BRAME ET AL., DIFFERENT LOVING: THE WORLD OF SEXUAL DOMI-
NANCE AND SUBMISSION 5 (1993) ("The practices and attitudes of contemporary sexual
dominants and submissives . . . largely abide by the credo of 'Safe, Sane, and Consen-
sual.'").
6
 William N. Eskridge, jr., The Many Faces of Sexual Consent, 37 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 47,
48 (1995).
7 Id.
8 There is some debate over the use of the word violence within the S/M context. For
example, one author suggests, "Consensual sadomasochism has nothing to do with vio-
lence. Consensual sadomasochism is about safely enacting sexual fantasies with a consent-
ing partner. Violence is the epitome of nonconsensuality, an act perpetrated by a predator
on a victim." CAROL TRUSCOIT, LEATIIERFOLK 15-16 (1992), as cited in WILLIAM N. ESK-
RIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 260 (1999)..
In this piece, I use the word "violence" within its legal definition: "Force, physical
force, force unlawfully exercised, the abuse of force, that force which is employed against
common right, against the laws, and against public liberty." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1742 (4th ed. 1968). Hence, within its legal definition, violence may be consensual activity
but still violate public policy and legal norms.
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nal law.9 On the other end, the state has a compelling interest in pro-
tecting its citizens from death. Thus, the law generally refuses to rec-
ognize consent as an absolute defense to homicides that occur during
sexual encounters, although consent can be a partial defense, mitigat-
ing murder to manslaughter." It is the gray area between sexual play-
fulness and death that plagues the law. .
In an ongoing and highly controversial case, People v. Jovanovic, 11
New York's highest court recently let stand a lower appellate court
decision holding, in effect, that consent can be a defense to violent
assault and battery occurring within the context of a sadomasochistic
encounter. 12 The case involves a male graduate student at Columbia
who was sentenced to fifteen years in prison for kidnapping, assault-
ing, and sexually abusing a female Barnard College student. The two
met online and frequently discussed on e-mail their mutual interest in
S/M. The victim admitted on e-mail to being in a sadomasochistic re-
lationship with another man, and described in intimate detail her
S/M fantasies, which included being tortured."
At trial, the victim testified that when the two met in person for
the first time, she voluntarily went to Jovanovic's apartment and
agreed to be tied to a futon as part of a sexual encounter. But she also
testified that she never consented to being tortured for twenty hours.
Jovanovic poured candle wax on her, bit her, shoved an object in her
rectum, and refused to release her even after she invoked a "safe
word" which meant "stop." Neighbors testified that they heard
screams coming from the apartment and friends corroborated her
injuries." The defendant did not take the stand, but his attorney jack
Litman, who also defended the "preppy murderer" Robert Chain-
bers, 15 claimed that this was all part of a consensual S/M encounter.
9 See R. v. Brown, 1 A.C. 212, 230 (Eng. H.L. 1994) (detailing the common law of vio-
lent consent and holding that "bodily harm. . .need not he permanent, but must, no
doubt, be snore than merely transient and trifling").
to See generally George E. Buzash, Note, The "Rough Sex" Defense, 80 J. CRIM. L. & Ctutyn-
NOLOGY 557 (1989) (reviewing the case law on the "rough sex" defense and finding that it
often serves to mitigate and in some cases exculpate defendants).
tt See People v. Joranovic, 95 N.Y.2d 846 (2000) (leave to appeal granted, decision
without published opinion) fovanovic II].
12 People v. jovanovie, 700 N.Y.S,2d 156 (App. Div. 1999) I , hereinafter fovanovic /1.
19 See id. at 164.
14 See id. at 174.
19 Robert Chambers was charged with the murder of Jennifer Levin. Both were
affluent youths in New York City. On August 26, 1986, the two met at a local pub, where
they argued, and then left for a walk in Central Park. Two hours later, the police found
Levin's body, bruised and strangled. At trial, Mr. Litman, Chambers's attorney, contended
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The trial judge refused, under New York's Rape Shield Law, to
admit portions of the e-mail correspondence that related to the vic-
tim's experience with S/M." The Supreme Court of New York, Appel-
late Division, reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial. It held
that although the defendant had no constitutional right to engage in
S/M, the e-mail statements would have highlighted the complainant's
state of mind as to consent and the defendant's own state of mind re-
garding the reasonableness of consent." Thus, in the "interests of jus-
tice," the e-mails should have been admitted. 18 However, the court
failed to define what limits, if any, the law should place on private,
sexually-motivated violence, thus raising far more questions than it
answered. -
The crucial issue in kuanovic is not whether the jury believed the
victim. Rather, even if the jury believed that the victim consented, or
that Jovanovic was both reasonable and honest in believing that she
consented, is what he did to her still a crime? The New York Court of
Appeals implies that Jovanovic committed no crime if the victim con-
sented. This is significant because Jovanovic is the first appellate deci-
sion in the United States to so hold. Prior to this decision, courts in
the United States, England; and Canada have consistently maintained
that one cannot consent to any activity which could cause serious bod-
ily injury or death, i.e. violence, with a few exceptions," voluntary
participation in organized sports being the most Common. 20
Sex is not a sport, however, and prior to Jovanovic courts have re-
fused to recognize consent as a defense in S/M cases. In doing so,
they have relied on two arguments. First, moral outrage towards the
that Levin's death resulted from a mishap during rough sex. The prosecution eventually
plea-bargained from murder to manslaughter. See Buzash, supra note 10, at 558. The
"rough sex" defense was not invented by jack Litman, but was made popular by this case.
See LINDA A. FAIRSTEIN, SEXUAL VIOLENCE 125, 146 (1993).
16 See People v. Jovanovic, 676 N.Y.S.2d 392 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Trial Division 1997).
17 jovanovic 700 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
18 Id.
19 But see R. v. Christopher, BC9906145 (Supreme Court of Victoria—Criminal) (1999)
(reaching contrary conclusion in case where the victim died of erotic asphyxia and bond-
age). This is the only case of common law tradition to explicitly suggest that S/M may fall
within the sports exception to assault and battery. For a description of the case, see, Five
Years in Jail for Bondage Sex Death, AAP NEwsFEED, Sept. 3, 1999.
20 The other exceptions to the doctrine include surgery, body piercing, and tattooing,
which are activities regulated by the states in exercise of its police power. John S. Her-
brand, Regulation of the Business of Tattooing, 81 A.L.R. 3u 1212 (1977); see also Keith M.
Harrison, Lazo, Order & the Consent Defense, 12 ST. LOUIS U. Pus. L. REV. 477, 480, 501
(1993). This Article does not explore the relationship between consensual violence and
mercy killings or euthanasia.
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practice of S/M has often justified its illegality. 21 Second, and more
frequently, courts have refused to extend the sports exception to S/M
because the likelihood and degree of harm that could result is too
high while the social utility of the activity itself is not compelling. 22
Although Jovanovic is the first case to break with this legal tradi-
tion, it is not likely to be the last. S/M is going mainstream. 23 The psy-
chological community once considered those who practiced S/M
mentally 111. 24 Today, however, S/M is no longer universally considered
to be a fantasy or fetish confined to the "sexually deviant" and/or
sexual sub-cultures. The Institute for Advanced Study of Human
Sexuality estimates that at least one in ten adults has experimented
with some form of S/M and that it is most popular among educated,
middle and upper class men and women, 25 despite its association with
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. 26
S/M is so trendy, it is almost passe. Black leather is the look in
bars and clubs among the urban chic and tragically hip. Stories about
S/M appear in mainstream magazines like Psychology Today, Jane, and
the New Yorker. Noted authors such as Anne Rice write sadomasochistic
21 See, e.g., Barnes v. Glenn Theater, 501 U.S. 560, 574-75 (1991) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) ("Our society prohibits ... certain activities not because they harm others but be-
cause they are considered ... immoral. In American society, such prohibitions have in-
cluded, for example, sadomasochism ... suicide, drug use, prostitution, and sodomy.).
For articles and books on whether moral outrage alone is a sufficient governmental in-
terest to regulate private activity, see generally WILLIAM J. BENNETT, THE DEATH OF OUT-
RAGE: BILL CLINTON AND THE ASSAULT ON AMERICAN IDEALS (1998); ROBERT 14. BORK,
SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE (1997);
S.I. Strong, Romer v. Evans and the. Permissibility of Morality Legislation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1259
(1997); Peter M. Cicchino, Reason and the Rule of Law: Should Bare Assertions of "Public Moral-
ity" Qualify as Legitimate Government Interests. for the Proposes of Equal Protection Review?, 87
GEO. Lj. 139 (1998).
" See infra notes 80-102 and accompanying text.
25 Lauren Goodlad, You Gel Me Closer to God: Advertisers Are Taking S/M Mainstream, but
What Exactly Are We Buying?SEArru WEEKLY, Feb. 12, 1998, at 35.
24 See Apostolides, supra note 3, at 60 (noting that in the 1980s, the American Psychiat-
ric Association removed S/M as a category in its Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders); see alsoincx NOVICK & KERRY KELLY NOVICK, FEARFUL SYMMETRY: THE DEVEIr
OPMENT AND TREATMENT OF SADOMASOCHISM (1996) (reviewing psychoanalysis literature
on S/M); LYNN S. CHANCRE, SADOMASOCHISM IN EVERYDAY LIFE 69-88 (1992) (describing
psychoanalytic view of sadomasochism, particularly Freudian theory); S & M: STUDIES IN
DOMINANCE AND SUBMISSION (Thomas S. Weinberg ed., 1995).
25 SeeApostolidcs, supra note 3, at. 60 (qUoting Charles Moser).
2'5 See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 6, at 60-61 (arguing that while there is no "stereotypi-
cal" gay lifestyle, "the lesbian, gay male, and bisexual community is more relentlessly 'lib-
eral' about sexuality than is the straight community, including most straight women" and
that the gay experience is more sympathetic to S/M).
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erotica for the mass market. 27 Personal ads in newspapers and on web-
sites provide a private forum to find a partner. Those in search of
"how-to" manuals can bypass dirty bookstores for Barnes & Noble. Sex
shops that sell whips and chains and Velcro restraints are moving from
red light districts to upscale shopping areas. Websites advertising tor-
ture tools are a click away. Clubs and conferences for the curious and
the committed are commonplace. Anyone can become a card-
carrying member of the Black Rose 29 or the Disciplinary Wives Club.29
Images of beautiful people experiencing pleasure through pain ap-
pear in ads for Skyy Vodka, Bass Ale, Candies Shoes, and high-priced
fashion. It is the subject of popular songs, Hollywood movies, and
prime-time TV."
Admittedly, researching and writing about S/M is, in itself, risky
behavior." Thus, an author's preface seems in order. My interest in
the law of S/M began while prosecuting domestic violence cases. Of-
ten, defendants would claim that the injuries inflicted upon their in-
timate partners were a result of "rough sex" and thus raised consent as
a defense to charges of assault and battery. On more than one occa-
sion, I argued to a court that consent was immaterial." Furthermore,
I have argued that domestic violence victims should be mandated to
participate in the prosecution of their abusers—that women cannot
implicitly consent to violence by refusing to press charges or cooper-
27 See, e.g., ANNE RICE, EXIT To EDEN (1906).
28 See Black Rose Club Honiepage at http://www.br.org  (visited Aug. 15, 2000) (home-
page for the Black Rose, a nonprofit organization "which provides a forum for the many
different expressions of power in love and play").
29 See Disciplinary Wives Club Homepage at littp://jag-world.com/mist/DWC/DWG
main.litm (visited July 10, 1999) (describing itself as ''an organization whose purpose is to
encourage the application of 'Good Old Fashioned' spanking and other traditional meth-
ods of discipline by wives and committed partners.").
"David Brooks, The New Upper Class: How Conservatives Won the Cultural War and Lost the
Peace, WKLY. STANDARD, May 8, 2000, at 21.
Si For a description of the academic controversy surrounding S/M, see, e.g., Eddie
Hargreaves, Professors' Grant to Study S/M Stirs Controversy, U. WIRE, May 14, 1998 (describ-
ing controversy stirred when two Pacific University Professors received a $5000 grant to
study sadomasochism); see also Candace de Russy, Revolting Behavior: The Irresponsible Exercise
of Academic Freedom, CHRON. lhoitER EDuc., Mar. 6, 1998, at B9 (ridiculing an academic
conference on S/M); Andrea Neal, Promoting Sexual Deviancy an Campus, INDIANAPOLIS
Strut, June 18, 1998, at A16 (criticizing the American Association of University Professors
for giving its academic freedom award to a college president for hosting a conference on
sexuality that including the topic of sadomasochism).
32 For a description of such a case, see Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime
and Punishment of Domestic Violence, 39 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 1505, 1555-57 (1998).
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ate with the prosecution." But I had never handled a case where the
victim claimed that she had actually consented to violence as part of
an erotic encounter, so I had not considered whether the "no consent
to violence" doctrine as applied to S/M was practically, ethically, and
legally sound. Given the increasing number of cases involving S/M, I
thought it time to do so.
Thus, using the law as my lens, I became a voyeur into the world
of S/M. I did what scholars do. I researched, I read, 1 conducted an
occasional interview. Frankly, however, nothing in my previous work
or personal life prepared me for what I would see, and how I would
make sense of it. I have started and stopped this Article many times.
Sometimes the material challenged me. At other times, it confused
me. One day last summer, after going over sources on S/M that my
research assistant downloaded from the World Wide Web, I put away
my files and vowed never to return to this topic again.
I have returned to this issue because it raises questions for the
theory and practice of criminal law, which, while often times painful,
are necessary to explore. It is likely that more courts will be asked if
sex is a sport or should be treated like one. Whether yes, no, or some-
times, the answer will have serious shortcomings, both practically and
theoretically. The legal treatment of S/M exposes the ambiguity of
power and powerlessness, of masculinity and femininity, of coercion
and consent, and the limits and limitations of the law.
In Part I of this Article, I argue that if one looks at the historical
evolution of the doctrine of consent as applied to S/M, one finds it is
not primarily rooted in the state regulation of sex. 34 Rather, it is
rooted in a more fundamental question as to when violent aggression
is appropriate in a civilized state. Why the sports exception? I argue
that the sports exception is illustrative of the male heterosexual ac-
ceptance of violence in the context of competition and fair play. Vio-
lence, competition, and the construction of manhood are intricately
linked. So long as men are engaged in "above the belt" physically
competitive games, then the law accepts that injury may occur, just as
it accepts that fatalities will be a consequence of war. By allowing vio-
lence in sports but not sex, the law accepts and celebrates male com-
petitiveness and violence and at the same time channels and confines
it. Although the games and the rules may shift over time, one cannot
33 See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence
Prosecutions, 109 HAM'. L. REV. 1849 (1996) [hereinafter Hanna, No Right to Choose].
34 See info notes 48-79.
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separate the doctrine of consent from what it means to "be a man"
and to be a "gentleman."
In Part II, I challenge the liberal argument that one has a "right"
to engage in S/M by examining the practical application of the law of
consent within this context. 35 Liberals who argue that S/M should be
legal as a matter of private sexual autonomy, and that the current doc-
trine arguably serves to disguise sexual orientation discrimination,
provide only a partial explanation of the doctrine's evolution, and a
far from perfect normative conclusion. 38 For both gay men and
women, in particular, it is unclear whether recognizing consent pro-
motes sexual autonomy or gives further license to people—mostly
men—to brutalize their sexual partners and then claim that she or he
"asked for it." Throughout this Article, I discuss in detail the facts of
these cases, not for shock value, although some may find the facts
shocking. Rather, I include the facts because it is far too easy to make
abstract arguments about the nature of consent when consent is al-
ways grounded in the particulars of the case.
True, the issue of consent and violence in the criminal law makes
for some very strange bedfellows, albeit with different long-term ex-
pectations. I am well aware that arguing that as a legal matter not al-
lowing consent as a defense when the defendant claims that the injury
was part of an S/M encounter could be misconstrued as agreeing with
popular moralists or religious leaders.37 Yet, my argument is not that
S/M is itself immoral, but that within the context of an actual serious
physical injury, the law is best left undisturbed as to consent. Truth be
told, I have struggled with what the legal doctrine in this context
ought to be. Ultimately, I conclude that fovanovic was wrongly decided
and sets a dangerous precedent. 38
Initially, when I began this project, I anticipated arriving at the
opposite conclusion, for to suggest that people cannot consent to pri-
vate sexual matters seems unnecessarily paternalistic (or maternalis-
tic, as the case may be). In theory, liberals make a compelling argu-
ment that people should be able to exercise sexual autonomy and,
35 See infra notes 80-193.
36 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE
CLOSET 248-49 (1999).
" See, e.g., David Hinckley, Laura v. Gays: The Airwar Heats Up, N.Y. DAILY News, Mar. 8,
2000, at 42 (discussing controversy over Dr. Laura Schlesinger); Stephen Breen, Bishop Stirs
Up A Storm Over Sex, THE SCOTSMAN, July 10, 1999; John Boyle, Sadomasochism Troubles
Therapists, Spiritual Leaders, ASHEVI ILE CITIZEN-TIMES, Aug. 16, 1998, at Cl.
38 See infra notes 154-166.
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thus, legalizing S/M arguably would reduce its social stigma and allow
humans a full range of activities in which to express their intimate
sexual desires. 32 To allow the moral police to round up people for
what they do in private is to encroach on legitimate individual liberty.
Furthermore, when practiced properly, S/M requires that one respect
his partner's wants, desires, expectations, and limitations. Those who
engage in safe and consensual S/M have much to teach the rest of us
about what consent really means. Within the S/M context, consent is
not merely the absence of "no," but a far more qualitative conversa-
tion that involves negotiation, the sharing of fantasies and the setting
of limits. In theory, S/M distinguishes pain from violence. As a result,
few of these "pure" cases ever come to the attention of law enforce-
ment.
But some do. For example, in a recent case dubbed "Paddle-
boro," police in Attleboro, Massachusetts raided a BDSM (bondage,
discipline, and sadomasochism) private party and arrested both the
host and a guest who paddled another woman with a large wooden
kitchen spoon, allegedly causing bruising and bleeding.° The case
has sparked controversy over the limits of sexual freedom and caused
fear among those in the S/M community that they will be targeted by
law enforcement." The lawyers for the defendants argue that the state
has no interest in prosecuting the accused for assault and battery, es-
pecially when the victim does not complain.42 The state is going for-
ward with the prosecution." The Paddleboro case is one of the hard
cases where the legal restraints on violence may, in fact, undermine
individual liberty and persecute a woman who was engaged in accept-
able consensual violence with another woman. This sort of over-
reaching and sexual repression is precisely what both liberals and
many feminists fear, especially given that the nature of the injury did
not appear serious. Indeed, at least from the press reports, the prose-
cution seems motivated by politics, not protection."
39 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 36, at 256-57; GLORIA G. BRAME El' AL., supra note 5, at 3-
4.
Paddleboro Information Website at littp://www.paddleboro.com
 (visited Nov. 2,
2000); Cindy Rodriquez, Group Creates Defense Fund to Support seem Accused, THE BOSTON
GLoaE, July 27, 2000, at B6.
41 J.M. Lawrence, Of Human Bondage' S&M Community Unites to Defend Paddleboro Ma•-
tym,• Championing Different Strokes for Different Folks, Bos•rox HERALD, Oct. 27, 2000, at 39.
42 Judith Kelleher, S M:Why Not?, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 21, 2000, at Ml.
43
 Meredith GOldStIlitil, Prosecutor Defends Handling of Sadomasochism Party, THE PROVI-
DENCE JOURNAL, Nov. 2, 2000, at B3.
44 See id.
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Nevertheless, in setting rules as to when one can consent to vio-
lence, the law will either be under-inclusive or over-inclusive. In decid-
ing which horn of this dilemma is better (or less bad), 45 we have to
look at experience as well as theory in making that determination.
"Good" people can and should be able to freely consent to "bad"
things so long as no third party is hurt, at least in theory.* But, in
practice, the law should not allow consensual violence that results in
actual serious physical injury outside of highly regulated contexts. Cur-
rently, by holding someone strictly liable for actual injuries inflicted
outside of highly regulated contexts, the law checks (mostly male)
violence, be it against women or men. While, in rare cases, the doc-
trine could be over-inclusive by holding culpable those defendants
who played by the rules of S/M (and there are rules), in the vast ma-
. jority of cases that make it into the criminal justice system, consent is
questionable at best. Experience shows us that at this point in history,
the doctrine of strict liability more often has been invoked to protect
those most at risk of dehumanizing abuse than to persecute those who
are humane in their sexual encounters.
Furthermore, the state's interest in controlling and confining
violence is a compelling one, perhaps the most compelling of all.
While there is a legitimate individual liberty interest in protecting pri-
vate sexual conduct from unwarranted state interference, there is no
liberty interest to inflict serious bodily injury on others for the pursuit
of one's own pleasure. Although religion was once powerful enough
to both set the rules for this life (and to establish the standards for
getting to the next one) it does so no longer. The Ten Command-
ments have been replaced by criminal codes. The law now decides
when we can indulge our passions—be they motivated by lust or wrath
or pride—and what the consequences of doing so will be. Violence is
not always sexy, but often causes long lasting harm. The social goals of
promoting human dignity are better served by limiting, not extend-
ing, the doctrine of violent consent. To paraphrase H.L. Mencken, in
our own private pursuits of pleasure, here in Zion, today, we are all in
bondage to the law. 47
45 See Margaret J. Raclin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL L. REV. 1699, 1702
(1990).
46 See Richard Posner, Ask, Tea THE New REPUBLIC, Oct. 11, 1999, at 52 (arguing for
Million liberalism in domain of sex and sadomasochism).
47 In ON BEING AMERICAN (1922), ELL. Mencken wrote: "To be Happy one must be a)
well-fed, unbounded by sordid cares, at ease in Zion, b) full of a comfortable feeling of
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I. LET'S SETTLE THIS LIKE MEN
Historically, under the common law, violence, even if consensual,
was illegal. Thus, consent was no, defense when one engaged in an
activity that could cause physical injury or death, even if the "victim"
did not complain. Assaultive behavior is criminal behavior, as the
wrongdoer infringes upon and threatens the state's monopoly on the
legitimate use of force.48 The victim is merely a witness for the prose-
cution. Yet, courts have carved out exceptions to this general rule on
a case-by-case basis. In this section, I review the Anglo-American his-
tory of consensual violence in the sporting context, drawing primarily
from English, Canadian and American jurisprudence. Although few
American appellate courts have examined the doctrine of consensual
violence, both the Canadian Supreme Court and the British House of
Lords have taken up the issue in the last decade. Thus, American le-
gal scholars can benefit from the experiences of our common law
cousins in this area.
When discussing the issue of consensual violence, it is quite
common for commentators to assume that courts use the "harm test"
to decide the relevancy of consent—the more likely injury is to occur,
the less likely a court will allow the activity. In 1895, for example, in
the first American article to examine the issue of violence and con-
sent within the criminal law, the Harvard Law Review summarized the
doctrine of violent consent. "A game which involves physical struggle
may [be] a commendable and manly sport, or it may be an illegal
contest in which the participants are or may become criminals; this
depends on whether it is a game which endangers life."49 The premise
was that the level of injury inherent to the activity is what is crucial to
the law.
But courts have allowed all sorts of activities, including prize
fighting and hockey, which carry a high probability of injury, and dis-
allowed barroom brawling, which is arguably no more dangerous. In
practice, the likelihood of harm is more or less legally irrelevant. 50
superiority to the masses of one's fellow men, and c) delicately and unceasingly amused
according to one's tastes."
48 14arrison, supra note 20, at 478-79.
49 EH. Beale, Consent in the Criminal Law, 8 14Anv. L. REv. 317, 325 {1895).
5° For example, one of the earliest statements regarding consensual violence is found
in 1-lawkin's Pleas to the Crown;
[11f death ensues from such [sports] as are innocent and allowable, the case
will fall within the rule of excusable homicide; but if the sport be unlawful in
itself, or productive of danger, riot or disorder, from the occasion, so far as to
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What is legally relevant is the social utility of the activity itself. The law
clearly distinguished between those contexts in which men competed
to enhance their manliness and those contexts in which their aggres-
sion went unchecked, or inspired runaway passion by the parties or
observers. Instrumental violence—that which serves a "manly" pur-
pose—is legal, but expressive, emotional violence, which carries with
it too high a risk of social unrest, is not.51
 Thus, lawmakers have whit-
tled down the playing field, so to speak, by legalizing only those sport-
ing activities that promote what I call civilized masculinity. 52
How have courts gone about deciding when a sport is legal? A
review of the case law suggests that judges draw heavily upon the so-
cial norms at the time. Regina v. Bradshaw, one of the earliest cases to
address this issue, illustrates the importance of male culture when de-
ciding what men and gentlemen can do." During a "friendly game of
football" the deceased, Herbert Dockerty, was dribbling the ball to-
wards the goal when the defendant, William Bradshaw, a player on the
opposing team, charged Dockerty, jumped in the air, and struck him
in the stomach with his knee. Dockerty died the next day of a rup-
tured intestine. There was conflicting evidence as to whether Brad-
shaw had engaged in unfair play, but the game was played in accor-
dance with the "Association Rules."54
In deciding whether Bradshaw was guilty of manslaughter, Justice
Bramwell stated, "No rules or practice of any game whatever can
make that lawful which is unlawful by the law of the land; and the law
of the land says that you shall not do that which is likely to cause the
death of another."55
 Thus, Bramwell makes clear that the law decides
whether the context in which the injury occurs is legal, while the deci-
sion reveals that it is a case-by-case, highly context-specific inquiry. To
criminalize football in England would have been absurd and unimag-
inable. Not surprisingly, Bramwell ultimately found the defendant not
guilty. "No doubt the game was, in any circumstance, a rough one; but
[his Lordship] was unwilling to decry the manly sports of this country,
endanger the peace, and death ensure; the party killing is guilty of man-
slaughter.
1 HAWKIN'S PLEAS OF THE CROWN, ch. 15 (8th ed. 1824).
51 See Beale, supra note 49, at 325.
52 See generally James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility & Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE
L.J. 1279 (2000).
53
 14 Cox C.C. 83, 84 (1878) (Eng.).
54 See id.
Id. at 84-85.
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all of which were no doubt attended with more or less danger."56
While the facts indicate that Bradshaw may have committed a foul
when charging Dockerty, there was no evidence that he was motivated
by personal animus or acted outrageously, and thus Bradshaw had
done nothing wrong, at least legally. 57
Had Bradshaw been guilty of manslaughter, then the state argua-
bly could prosecute any player who injured or attempted to injure an-
other for assault and battery, or even homicide, even if he had broken
no rules of the game. Bramwell's opinion shows how courts take into
account the public acceptance and even love of the game in question
as well as the motive (as opposed to the intent) of the defendant in
causing the harm. So long as men play like gentlemen—fair and
above the belt—any resulting injury is of no concern to the criminal
law.
Sports such as soccer or rugby or hockey, 58 where violence is in-
cidental, albeit expected, to the game itself, have enjoyed enormous
legal protection. In civil cases where one injured player sues another,
courts are very reluctant to punish those who foul but do not act so
outrageously as to have crossed the line between bad sportsmanship
and culpably bad sportsmanship.59 In contrast, many activities that
involve the intentional infliction of bodily harm as the goal of the
game have been outlawed or severely restricted. For example, duel-
ling was once legal and tolerated unless one of the participants was
maimed—a bodily harm whereby a man was deprived of the use of
any body parts that he needed to fight. 6° The act of maiming was un-
lawful because it deprived the King of the services of his subjects for
defense of the realm. Duelling is no longer legal in England and
America, despite some early public resistance, because courts decided
56 Id.
57 See id.
55 Ice hockey has presented a host of problems for Canadian courts in particular. See,
e.g., Regina v. Ciccarelli, 54 C.C.C. (3d) 121 (Can. 1989). Like football and soccer, profes-
sional ice hockey is a contact sport where, while physical contact is what makes the game
the game, injury is incidental to the game itself. To intentionally inflict harm is not the
purpose, but an anticipated consequence of the activity itself.
59 See, e.g., Nahozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258, 11.10 (III. 1975) ("This court believes
that the law should not place unreasonable burdens on the free and vigorous participation
in sports by our youth. However, we also believe that organized, athletic competition does
not exist in a vacuum. Rather, some of the restraints of civilization must accompany every
athlete on to the playing field."); jaworski v. Kiernan, 696 A.2d 332, 337 (Conn. 1997);
Dilger v. Moyles, 54 Cal. App. 4th Stipp. 1452 (1997). See also Jack Anderson, Cities, Aldus,
Farina?A Study of Ciiminal Violence in Sport, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 87 (2000).
co) See lIAWKIN'S, supra note 50, at ch. 15.
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that the activity was too dangerous and served no legitimate public
interest. Fencing, however, remains a varsity sport, although fencers
must wear protective gear, thereby reducing any risk of injury.61 In
contrast, wrestling and prize fighting are legal, even though the pur-
pose of the sport is to injure, but it is only professional boxers who
can spar without protective headgear. 62 Nevertheless, even in prize
fighting, there are some very clear rules, such as no hitting below the
belt. One referee for two participants arguably ensures that the rules
will be followed and the safety of the players protected.
Few cases are ever criminally prosecuted when one player injures
another,63 at least in America, 64
 although this trend may be chang-
ing.° Prosecutors are increasingly imposing a standard of civilized
masculinity on both high school 66 and professional players. Take, for
example, Marty McSorley, the Boston Bruins hockey player who hit
Donald Brashear of the Vancouver Canucks in the head with a stick
during a National Hockey League game, knocking him unconscious. 67
Hockey is a dangerous sport and thus players implicitly consent to a
certain level of violence, but McSorley crossed that line. A Canadian
criminal court found McSorley guilty of assault with a deadly weapon
61 See generally THE HISTORY OF FENCING: FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN EUROPEAN
SWORDPLAY (William M. Gaugler & Lance C. Lobs eds., 1998).
62 For au excellent history of the law of prize fighting, see R. v. Brown, I A.G. 212, 262-
65) (Mustill, L., dissenting) (Eng.H.L. 1993).
65 But see People v. Freer, 381 N.Y.2d 976 (1976) (sustaining third degree assault charge
in altercation between football players that took place after the players got up front a pile-
up).
64 Jody Goldstein, Acts of Violence in the Sporting Arena Increasingly are Finding Their Way
Into the Courtroom, HOUS. CHRON., May 5, 2000, at 1 (noting that Canada has long prose-
cuted athletes for injuries inflicted on the playing field, especially hockey games); Bonnie
DeSimone, Violence Between the Sidelines Seldom Leads to Court, CI-H. TRIB., Dec. 20, 2000, at 1
(citing Matt Mitten, Director of Marquette University's National Institute on Sports Law as
saying, "It is generally accepted that there is a level of contact and violence that is part of
the game, even though it would be considered unacceptable off the field. Courts don't
want to chill vigorous competition.").
65 See DeSinmise, supra note 69, at I (noting that there have been at least five arrests in
2000 of players who inflicted injury on another during a sporting event). For a discussion
of Canada's response to sports and violence, see generally, Diane V. White, Sports Violence
as Criminal Assault: Development of the Doctrine 11 Canadian Courts, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1030
(1986).
66 See, e.g., Chip Scoggins, High School Hockey: Checks & Balances, STAR TRIB. (Minnea-
polis-St. Paul), Jan. 19, 2000, at 1C (discussing case in which a fifteen-year-old boy from
suburban Chicago faced criminal charges after he cross-checked from behind an oppo-
nent and left him paralyzed).
67 See Dave Luecking, Following McSorley's Guilty Verdict, Many Players are Concerned that
More Cases will End Up in Court, ST. Louts POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 8, 2000, at D8.
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(his hockey stick) and sentenced him to eighteen months probation. 68
Although McSorley is one of only eleven NHL players to be prose-
cuted in the league's history,69 the conviction has sparked concerns
that even more sports cases will end up in court as prosecutors inter-
vene in serious cases that would otherwise be left for the league to
handle." The McSorley case may indeed signal a growing state inter-
est in confining violence in sport' which is outside the rules of the
game, or motivated by unrestrained passion or personal animus.
The law, then, sets limits on what it means to "settle things like a
man" and has not extended the right to fight beyond organized sports
played within the rules of the game. For example, in Regina v. Jobidon,
the Canadian Supreme Court was asked to revisit the consensual vio-
lence doctrine in a typical bar room brawl situation. 71 The case illus-
trates the underlying assumptions about how men should be able to
express their aggression at any given point in history, and how deeply
rooted those assumptions are within the common law tradition. It is
also a case which suggests that there are limits on personal autonomy
outside of the sexual sphere.
The defendant, Jules Jobidon, a "young, fit and powerful man,"
according to the court, was in a hotel bar one night with friends when
Rodney Haggart approached him. Haggart was at the hotel celebrat-
ing his upcoming marriage and drinking heavily. Haggart was larger
than Jobidon and had trained as a boxer. It is not clear what triggered
the brawl, but Haggart was "prevailing" when the hotel manager sepa-
rated the men and told Jobidon to leave the bar. He and Haggart ex-
changed words in the lobby that indicated that the two intended to
finish the fight. After Haggart left the bar, he found Jobidon and his
friends waiting in the parking lot. A crowd had now gathered. Jobidon
threw the first punch, then another, and another, and within a few
seconds, Haggart was knocked backward onto a hood of a car. Uncon-
scious and bleeding, he was taken to the hospital in a coma where he
died of severe contusions to the head. The trial judge found Jobidon
not guilty of manslaughter, given the consent to a fair fist fight. The
Crown appealed and the Ontario Appellate Court set aside the acquit-
tal and substituted a guilty verdict. The issue raised before the Cana-
dian Supreme Court was whether the absence of consent is a material
68 See brecking, supra note 67, at D8.
69 See Steve Ziplay, Questionable Decision; McSorley Ruling Renews Debate on How to Handle
Violence in Sports, NEwsDAY , Oct. 8, 2000, at C10.
70 See Ltrecling, supra note 67, at D8 (discussing the reaction to McSorley verdict).
n [1991] S.C.R. 714 (Can. 1991).
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element which must be proved by the Crown in all cases of criminal
assault or whether there are common law limitations which restrict or
negate the legal effectiveness of consent in certain types of cases."
The Canadian Supreme Court discussed at length the origins of
the consent doctrine as applied to violence and made clear that con-
sent's status as a defense is ultimately a matter of policy." The court
was not apologetic for its case-by-case approach in the area, comment-
ing that courts were well-suited to balance individual autonomy (the
freedom to choose to have force intentionally applied) and some
larger social interest. In upholding the conviction, the court explicitly
rejected the argument that pugilism was sheltered by chivalry. It
stated:
Duelling was an activity not only condoned, but required by
honour. Those days are fortunately long past. Our social
norms no longer correlate strength of character with prow-
ess at fisticuffs. . .. Erasing long-standing limits on consent
would be a regressive step, one which would retard the ad-
vance of civilized norms of conduct. 74
Both the holding and the reasoning of this case are consistent with
American law concerning the social acceptability of street fighting.
The fear is that passions in situations such as street fighting can go
unchecked, and therefore the state has an overriding interest in en-
suring some level of peace among its citizenry.
The Canadian Supreme Court declined to extend its holding to
other contexts, including S/M, but the court's analysis suggests that it
would not allow consent to any activity where the risk of unrestrained
aggression was too great." The law has not evolved to condone male
violence. Rather, it has evolved to control it, enforcing a code of
physical competition and fair play—civilized masculinity. This is, over-
all, a good thing. First, competition and physical aggression are part
and parcel of human nature, and to disallow it entirely would run
counter to human experience." Yet, by limiting legal violence to
72 See id. at 725.
73 See id. at 762.
74 Id.
75 See id. at 733-34.
76 See generally MICHAEL GHIGLERI, THE DARK SIDE OF MAN (2000) (tracing the origins
of male violence); FRANS DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED (1996); FRANS DE WAAL, CHIMPANZEE
POLITICS (1990); Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Introduction and Applica-
tion to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117 (1997) (reviewing a biological model of human
behavior and its applications to the law); Robert Wright, The Biology of Violence, THE NEW
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highly regulated contexts, the law implicitly imposes parity between
the players, thus minimizing the possibility of excessive injury and ex-
ploitation, as well as maintaining social control of its citizenry.
Although historically the law of violence was really just the law of
men and gentlemen, cultural and legal norms have evolved such that
women too may now compete in the same ways that men do. One
need only look to the history and spirit behind Title 1X77 and
women's equity in athletics" to see that women, like men, not only
enjoy competition, but that physical competition within an organized
arena can promote personal growth. The benefits of physical compe-
tition for both boys and girls have been well documented." Women
are now even partaking in the most violent of sports, including box-
ing. Girlfighting, a documentary of women boxers, for example, illus-
trates that female physical competition is no longer considered so-
cially unacceptable, but, in many cases, celebrated as a mark of female
liberation. It is not physical aggression per se that is problematic, but
the context in which it occurs.
By limiting consensual violence to activities that take place within
a regulated environment, the law not only serves the practical pur-
pose of reducing injury, but it also theoretically shifts cultural norms
YORKER, Mar. 13, 1995, at 68 (examining male competition and violence, especially among
male gang members).
77 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994). For a history of Title IX, see Diane Heckman, Scoreboard:
A Concise Chronological Tiventy-Five Year History . of Title IX Involving Interscholastic and Intercolle-
giate Athletics, 7 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 391 (1997).
78 See generally WHATEVER IT TAKES: WOMEN ON WOMEN'S SPORTS (Joli Sandoz Sc Joby
Winans eds., 1999); SUSAN K. CAHN, COMING ON STRONG: GENDER AND SEXUALITY IN
TWENTIETH CENTURY WOMEN'S SPORTS (1994); MARIAN BURTON NELSON, EMBRACING
VICTORY: LIFE LESSONS IN COMPETITION AND COMPASSION—NEW CHOICES FOR WOMEN
(1998); MARY TURCO, CRASHING THE NET: THE U.S. WOMEN'S OLYMPIC ICE HOCKEY TEAM
AND THE ROAD TO GOLD (1999); JEAN ZIMMERMAN AND GIL REAVILL, RAISING OUR ATH-
LETIC DAUGHTERS 165 (1998); Cheryl Hanna, Good Girls and Bad Sports: Violent Female ftl cc-
nile Delinquents, Title IX, and the Promise of Girl Power, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. (forthcom-
ing 2000); Mariali Burton Nelson, Learning What Team Really Means, NEWSWEEK, July 19,
1999, at 55.
" See Force v. Pierce City R-IV School District, 570 F. Stipp. 1020, 1031 (W.D. Mo.
1983). In ruling that the plaintiff should he allowed to try out for the football team, the
court held, "Nicole Force obviously has no legal entitlement to a starting position on the
Pierce City Junior High School eighth grade football team .... But she seeks no such enti-
tlement here. Instead, she seeks simply a chance, like her male counterparts, to display
those abilities. She asks, in short, the right to try. But the idea that one should be allowed
to try—to succeed or fail as one's own abilities and fortunes may dictate, but in the process
at least to profit by those things which are learned by trying—is a concept deeply en-
grained in our way of thinking; and it should indeed require a 'substantial' justification to
deny that privilege to someone simply because she is a female rather than a male." Id.; see
also Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 188 (1st Cir. 1996).
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of masculinity. There are no referees in a bar room brawl, no code of
conduct, and no crowd control. Men can no longer use weapons, un-
less they wear protective gear. And women can now get in the game.
We find far less social value in violent physical competition than we
did when duelling was legal, and it is no longer a manly duty to kill or
be killed outside of the context of war. Although many argue that we
are mired in a cult of violence, the law has at least served as a symbolic
and practical check on natural human aggression in general, and vio-
lent male competition, in particular.
II. LEGAL RESTRAINTS
Should the law treat sex as it does sport and allow the parties to
consent to physical injury? Some commentators have argued that the
state has no interest in regulating private, consensual sexual conduct,
and that the doctrine of violent consent is, too often, used to perse-
cute people considered to be sexual deviants, as well as to deny
women sexual agency." If people can consent to play hockey, why
can't they consent to private sexual activity which is arguably no more
dangerous? Yet, to allow defendants who inflict serious physical injury
on others during sexual encounters to avoid culpability under a the-
ory of consent would be to reverse the trend to confine the use of
physical force to highly regulated contexts. The argument that sex is a
sport has the unintended consequence of allowing people, mostly
men, to use violence to satiate their sexual desires, redefining civilized
masculinity within a sexual context.
In this section, I review the most prominent cases where defen-
dants have asked a court to treat sex as similar to sport and thus allow
the consent defense. It is clear from a review of these cases that refus-
ing to change the doctrine of consent as applied to sexual encounters
is an effective shield, more often protecting, albeit at times punishing,
those who have not yet been granted full sexual autonomy under the
law. It is an imperfect solution to one of the law's most difficult prob-
lems.
80 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 36, at 259-63; Sangeetha Chandra-Shekran, Critique &
Comment: Theorizing the Limits of Sadomasochistic Homosexual Identity in R. v. Brown, 21 MEL-
BOURNE U. L. Rxv. 584 (1997).
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A. Be A Man: The Gaylaw Critique
There are cases in which homosexual men have been singled out
for state prosecution, and, in many of those cases, the court imposes a
notion of civilized masculinity that is repressive. True, the cases dis-
cussed in this section are difficult, and the social utility of the prose-
cutions questionable. Nevertheless, we must be careful before suggest-
ing that the law of violent consent is always used as a tool of
discrimination. Rather, the doctrine often serves to protect gay men
from physical violence by their intimate partners. In all three cases
discussed below, the courts could have allowed consent to be a de-
fense, analogizing S/M to sport or holding that S/M fell within the
realm of private sexual conduct exempt from state regulation. This
would have created a "you asked for it, you got it" doctrine and de-
nied legal protections to gay men as well as reinforced stereotypes
about sexual deviancy.
1. People v. Samuels
People v. Samuels was the first American case in which a court re-
fused to extend the doctrine of violent consent to an assault and bat-
tery within an S/M context.81 American courts often cite this case
positively for its holding. 82 Yet, although the jurisprudence in this area
has developed in large part from Samuels, a detailed discussion of it is
surprisingly absent in the literature. 88 It is a complicated case and one
M which a more nuanced discussion of both the facts and the holding
sheds some light as to why the court did both the right thing and the
wrong thing in upholding Samuels' conviction.
A California court convicted Marvin Samuels, an ophthalmolo-
gist, of aggravated assault, as well as conspiracy and sodomy, after a
photo processing company turned over to the police a film that Sa-
muels had developed. The film showed "a gagged and naked man
strung up in an unfinished room, 'receiving a beating with whips and
lashes administered by . . . [the defendant]."84 There were marks on
the victim's buttocks, his back, and up his body, although there was
81 See 58 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1967).
82 See, e.g., fovanovic I, 700 N.Y.S.2d 156, 167 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); State v. Collier, 372
N.W.2d 303, 306 (Iowa 1985).
85 For a brief discussion of the case and the law of consent, see Note, Assault and Bat-
tery—Consent of Masochist N Beating by Sadist is No Defense to Prosecution for Aggravated Assault,
81 HARV. L. REV. 1339 (1968).
84 Samuels, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 442-43.
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considerable debate over whether the injuries were real or staged.
The victim was never affirmatively identified, nor did he appear at
trial. Samuels admitted that he was a sadist, and that he made the film
in order to control and release his sadomasochistic urges in ways that
were harmless.85
 He further testified that the man in the film had
heard of him through the San Francisco "underground" and that he
had fully consented to being beaten on the film. While he did string
up the man and strike him lightly with a riding crop, the injuries were
cosmetically applied and the victim was merely acting. The court
noted that an aggravated assault could occur without the infliction of
any physical injury, and therefore found it irrelevant as to whether the
victim was actually physically injured.88
 The state also presented un-
impeached expert testimony that the films were not altered or faked,
suggesting that the injuries were, in fact, real.
On appeal, Samuels argued that the jury should have been in-
structed that the consent of the victim is an absolute defense to the
charge of aggravated assault. 87
 The California Court of Appeal re-
jected his argument, holding that consent of the victim is generally
not a defense to assault and battery, except in a situation involving
ordinary physical contact or blows incident to sports such as football,
boxing, or wrestling. 88
 The court not only suggested that both the de-
fendant and his alleged victim may have been suffering some mental
illness,89
 but it also explicitly refused to analogize S/M to sports. 9°
Thus, like Justice Bramwell in Bradshaw, the court drew a distinction
between "manly activity" and criminal activity, even though there is
arguably no difference between the level of injury that the victim can
sustain during an S/M encounter and a football match. Furthermore,
unlike in Bradshaw, where the victim actually died, here the victim was
not even aware that the case was being prosecuted.
This case is troubling for many reasons, not the least of which is
that it appears that the prosecution may have been motivated by fac-
tors other than public safety or bodily integrity. Rather, as in Bowers v.
Hardwick,91
 the United States Supreme Court case that upheld Gear-
85 See id, at 441.
88 See id. at 447.
87 See id. at 513.
88 See id.
" Samuels, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 513-14 ("It is a matter of common knowledge that a person
in full possession of his mental faculties does not freely consent to the use, upon himself,
of force likely to produce great bodily injury.").
" Id. at 513.
91 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986).
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gia's sodomy statute, at least as applied to homosexual sodomy, law
enforcement appeared to be more concerned with persecuting a gay
man. The California court was clearly morally outraged that a "good
doctor" would engage in such "bad" acts, judging Samuels both legally
and morally."
But Samuels is distinguishable from Bowers in one very important
respect. In the case of homosexual sodomy, arguments as to the "so-
cial harm" are merely rhetorical. There is no empirical data that ho-
mosexual sodomy causes any measurable social harm. In contrast,
there was evidence in Samuels that the "victim" sustained actual physi-
cal injury. Furthermore, it is troubling that the "victim" was not
identified. There was no way to know if the filmmaking was consen-
sual. The case can certainly, and rightfully, be criticized in that the
state may have targeted Samuels because of his sexual orientation.
And it is questionable whether the state could even have met its bur-
den of proof absent the defendant's testimony; even with it, the
sufficiency of the evidence seems lacking."
Yet, if the jury believed that the man on the film had been
beaten, then it arguably had a moral and legal duty to hold Samuels
criminally culpable, at least if one accepts the premise that the law
should limit consensual violence to highly regulated activities. Fur-
thermore, without any witnesses there was no way to prove that the
acts were consensual. Even assuming that the doctor was truthful in
his statements that the injuries were staged, it should indeed give us
pause for concern as to what actually happened to the "victim." Had
the person on the film been a woman, would we not be concerned
that she was beaten? Would we not wonder why the doctor did not
know her name or her whereabouts?
Granted, this is a hard case to discuss within a contemporary con-
text. In the late 1960's, the public was far more hostile to homosexual-
ity than it is now, and the medical community still looked upon both
homosexuality and sadomasochism as mental abnormalities." Thus,
92 See Samuels, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
" But see People v. Doggett, 83 Cal. App.2d 405 (1948) (holding that photographs or
films are admissible as probative evidence where there is unimpeached expert testimony
that they were not faked).
94 See, generally, William N. Eskridge, Jr. No Promo Homo The Sedimentation of Antigay
Discourse and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N. Y. U. L. REV. 1 327 (2000); Odena
R. Neil, The Limits of Legal Discourse: Learning From the Civil Rights Movement in the Qust for
Gay and Lesbian Civil Rights, 40 N. Y. L. Sett .L. REV. 679 (1996); Elvia R. Arriola, Faeries,
Marimachas, Queens Ce Lezzies: The Construction of Homosexuality Before the 1969 Stonewall Riots,
'5 COLUMJ.GENDER & LAW 33 (1995).
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we can be sympathetic to the fact that Samuels had to conduct his
sexual life underground, and may have in fact been protecting the
man on the film by not releasing his name. Nevertheless, had the case
somehow arisen today, we would no doubt feel a sense of ambiva-
lence. On one hand, we want to protect Samuels and his civil right
not to be singled out by bigoted law enforcement; on the other hand,
we must be concerned for the safety and dignity of the unknown man
on the film. Thus, in order to understand the cases that follow Sa-
muels, it is imperative to appreciate the complexity and ambiguity of
the origins of the S/M case law. In many of the cases that follow, the
court both protects and prosecutes gay men, raising questions as to
the relationship between violence, manliness, and sexual expression.
2. Commonwealth v. Appleby
The next reported case involving S/M is the 1980 case of Com-
monwealth v. Appleby.95 The facts of Appleby illustrate that the doctrine
of consensual violence can protect gay men from sexual abuse just as
it can persecute them based on their sexual status. Indeed, Appleby is
far more analogous to cases involving battered women than it is to
cases in which courts are morally outraged by homosexuality, and il-
lustrates the difficulty in arguing that the legal treatment of S/M
serves only to disguise sexual orientation discrimination.
The defendant, Kenneth Appleby, and the victim, Steven Cromer,
lived together for two years in what the court characterized as a "ho-
mosexual, sadomasochistic" relationship. During that time, Cromer
allegedly lived as Appleby's "servant," which meant that not only did
he perform household duties, but also was subjected to beatings when
Appleby was dissatisfied. The court noted that the residence looked
like a military camp; Appleby owned a number of weapons and had
designed a torture chamber. 96
Over the course of the relationship, Appleby badly beat Cromer
numerous times with a bullwhip: fracturing his kneecap, once sending
him to the hospital, and even beating him so severely that Cromer ran
from the house in his underwear to a monastery. Cromer claimed at
trial that Appleby was indeed a sadist, but denied being a homosexual
himself or that he consented to the beatings. Indeed, Cromer's testi-
mony was not dissimilar to the testimony that many abused women
give as to why they stay with abusive partners. Cromer said that he suf-
as
	 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 1980).
96 See id. at 1053.
March 2001]	 Consent and Violence in Criminal Law	 261
fered low self-esteem, was afraid of Appleby, and acted under duress,
fearing that Appleby would harm him or his family if he did not con-
tinue the relationship. 97
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reiterated that con-
sent is no defense to sadomasochistic activities, even when engaged in
for the explicit purpose of sexual gratification. 98 The court was careful
to note that Appleby was in no way charged with a crime for commit-
ting homosexual acts. Rather, he was tried and convicted under a
statute that implied, as a matter of public policy, that one could not
consent to be the victim of an assault and battery within a sexual con-
text."
The outcome of this case is not nearly as troubling as Samuels, In
contrast to Samuels, in Appleby there was a complaining witness, as well
as a great deal of evidence that Cromer was injured. In upholding
Appleby's conviction, the court was protecting Cromer, despite his
sexual orientation, as much as holding Appleby accountable for his
violence, regardless of his sexual orientation. Furthermore, the court
in Appleby goes out of its way to suggest that this is not a case directed
against homosexuals, but rather focuses on the nature of the violence
itself, suggesting that one cannot invoke the S/M defense in a case of
assault with a deadly weapon, regardless of the victim's identity.
Had the court come to the opposite result, defendants in every
case of intimate abuse, be it in same-sex or heterosexual relationships,
could argue that they too had an explicit contract with their partner
that included physical punishment. The progress that has been made
in prosecuting domestic violence cases and holding batterers crimi-
nally liable would have been almost impossible under such circum-
stances. There is a common stereotype that women who stay in abu-
sive relationships not only deserve it, but like it. 1" Sadism would thus
become a natural state for men, while masochism would become a
natural state for women—arguably a relationship with which the law
should not interfere.
Similarly, in cases involving homosexual men, the fear is that ju-
ries will nullify the law, finding the victims "sick" or "sexually deviant."
Like battered women, abused men not only like being beat, but get
97 See id. at 1054,
98 See id. at 1059-60.
" See id.
100 See, e.g., Natalie Limier Clark, Crime Begins at Home: Let's Stop Punishing Victims and
Perpetuating Violence, 28 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 263 (1987); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Vio-
lence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. Rev. 973 (1991).
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what they deserve as well, albeit for different reasons. By refusing to
extend acceptance of consensual violence when a defendant claims
consensual S/M, the law ensures that neither gay men nor abused
women are stereotyped as pathological. 101
Suggesting that consensual violence is a normal part of a gay life-
style could arguably be the cause of more, not less, sexual orientation
discrimination. The public perception of what is "normal" behavior in
a homosexual relationship is often based on crude stereotypes of the
sexual deviant. This perception is illustrated by the reaction of police
officers in the case of Konerak Sinthasomphone, Jeffrey Dahmer's
fourteen-year-old victim.'" Before Dahmer's killing spree was finally
ended, the police had the opportunity to stop him and thereby save
the lives of five young men. However, because the officers involved
believed that violence was the norm in a male homosexual relation-
ship, they failed to intervene, and Dahmer was free to kill again and
again.
The chance to prevent Dahmer from committing further atroci-
ties came on May 27, 1991, when two teenage cousins saw a young boy,
whom they described as "butt naked," bleeding, and having difficulty
speaking. The young women immediately called 911, and attempted
to explain the situation to the police when they arrived. However, by
this time Dahmer had arrived on the scene and the officers simply
took him at his word that the fourteen-year-old Konerak was his nine-
teen-year-old lover.
Speaking only to Dahiner and ignoring the attempts by Konerak
to speak in Laotian, the police believed Dahmer when he said that
Konerak had too much to drink and wandered naked into the street
while Dahmer was out getting more beer. The cousins tried to explain
to the police that Dahmer was lying and that he was using physical
force against Konerak before the officers' arrival, but they were ig-
nored. According to the police, Dahmer's behavior suggested embar-
rassment. He told them that "everybody has to be into something."
One officer later testified that Dahmer "appeared to be a normal in-
101 See also People v. Murphy, 899 P.2d 294 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding as reversible
error a lower court's refusal to allow the defendant to cross examine the complaining wit-
ness about his sexual orientation or to introduce expert testimony about the possible be-
havior of homosexual men with sexual identity conflicts in order to go to the issue of con-
sent.), rev'd, 919 P.2d 191 (Colo. 1996) (holding that questions about a victim's sexual
orientation are barred under Colorado's Rape Shield statute and that this case did not fall
into a statutory exception.).
102 Peter Kwan, Intersections of Race, Ethnicity, Class, Gender & Sexual Orientation: Jeffrey
Dahmer and the Cosynthesis of Categories, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1257, 1258 (1997).
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dividual" and that they were "convinced that all was well." Therefore,
without running Dahmer's name for warrants or arrests, the officers
helped to return Konerak to Dahmer's apartment. Shortly after the
police left, Dahmer proceeded to finish what he had started and
murdered Konerak. 103
Thus, we must be careful before suggesting that all law enforce-
ment officers are out to criminalize male sexual deviants. As the
Dahmer case shows, in many cases law enforcement expects, possibly
even tacitly condones, homosexual male violence. Were the law en-
forcement officers enforcing the law, they would not have simply pre-
sumed that what was happening to Dahmer's victim was consensual,
nor would they have presumed it to be acceptable. This case, in many
respects, is similar to police responses when they arrived at a domestic
violence scene. A little battering was often considered "necessary,"
and women often left without any protection. 104 The holding in Ap-
pleby signals the law's willingness to provide protection to those often
considered unworthy of it, again illustrating the positive effects of the
doctrine.
3. Regina v. Brown
Just as hard cases make bad law, bad cases show us why the law is
hard. Regina v. Brown is the most famous case involving gay men and
sadomasochism that did not result in death. 105 Admittedly, it high-
lights both the practical use and potential misuse of state power in
this context. In 1993, the British House of Lords decided this case,
otherwise known as the "Spanner case"—Scotland Yard's code name
for the investigation. 106 The case was highly controversial and received
a great deal of press coverage and academic commentary, and is con-
sidered to be the biggest "bust" of a gay male sex club in history. Scot-
land Yard investigated a "ring" of sadomasochistic men who practiced
at an S/M sex club, and eventually confiscated some videotapes. On
the videotapes, the appellants, three middle-aged white men, along
with several other men, are shown engaged in a number of sadotnaso-
103 See id.
104 See Hanna, No Right to Choose, supra note 33, at 1857-65 (describing police re-
sponses to domestic violence).
1°5 1 A.G. 212 (Eng. H.L. 1993). For cases in which S/M activities arguably resulted in
death, see, e.g., Minnesota v. Pero, 590 N.W.2d 319 (Minn. 1999); Lehner v. State, 631
So.2d 273 (Ala. 1993); Gilpin v. State, 1991 Vs'L 84067 (Tex. Grim. App. 1991).
106 For a description of the case, see BILL TIIOMPSON, SADOMASOCHISM: PAINFUL, PER-
VERSION OR PLEASURABLE PLAY? (1994).
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chistic acts. The "victims" were younger men, one not yet twenty-one,
which was the legal age of consent for homosexual activity. There was
much discussion in the case as to whether the "victims" were recruited
or corrupted by the defendants. The extent to which the "victims"
willingly submitted to the encounters remained unclear. The state had
no evidence suggesting that they were coerced or forced against their
will, although drinks and drugs were involved. 1°7
The defendants engaged in a range of behaviors including mal-
treatment of genitalia (with, for example, hot wax, sandpaper, fish
hooks, and needles) and ritualistic beatings either with the assailants'
bare hands or a variety of implements, including stinging nettles,
spiked belts and a cat-o'-nine-tails. There were instances of branding
and infliction of injuries which caused bleeding and left scarring. 1°8
The infliction of pain was subject to certain rules including "code
words" that would communicate to the sadist to stop as the pain be-
come unbearable. 1 °9 The activities took place in a highly controlled
and private setting, instruments were sterilized, and none of the par-
ticipants sought medical attention. 11°
While homosexual activities conducted in private are legal in
England, 111 the defendants were charged under the Offences Against
Person Act of 1861. 112 The defendants pled guilty and were sentenced
to a period of incarceration ranging from three to eighteen
months.'" They appealed, arguing that the prosecution must prove
lack of consent as an element of the crime.
Three of the five Lords upheld the conviction in an opinion that
outlines in elaborate detail the doctrine of violent consent. Their de-
cision is representative of the different strands of argument against
S/M. Writing for the majority, Lord Templeton noted:
1 °7 Brown, 1994 1 A.C. at 236.
10® See Laskey v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 39,41 (1997).
1°2 See THOMAS E. MURRAY & THOMAS R. MURRELL, THE LANGUAGE OF SADOMASO-
CHISM: A GLOSSARY AND LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS 1 18  (1989) (defining a safe word as "a word
which, when uttered by the masochist during a sadomasochistic scenario lets the sadist
know that the masochist has reached his or her limits of pain or believes that things are
generally getting out of hand and wants to stop").
no Brown, 1 A.C. at 236.
Ilt Sexual Offences Act of 1967, c. 60, § 1 (Eng.) ("a homosexual act in private shall
not be an offence provided that the parties consent thereto and have attained the age of
21.").
112 Section 20 reads "Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously wound or inflict any
grievous bodily injury on another person, either with or without any weapon or instru-
ment, ... shall be liable ... to imprisonment ... for not more than five years."
112 See 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 42-43.
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In principle there is a difference between violence which is
incidental and violence which is inflicted for the indulgence
of cruelty. The violence of sadomasochistic encounters in-
volves the indulgence of cruelty by sadists and the degrada-
tion of victims. Such violence is injurious to the participants
and unpredictably dangerous. I am not prepared to invent a
defense of consent for sadomasochistic encounters which
breed and glorify cruelty .... Society is entitled and bound
to protect itself against a cult of violence. Pleasure derived
from the infliction of pain is an evil thing. Cruelty is uncivi-
lized.114
Lord Templeton clearly invoked the moral outrage argument, which
could lead one to interpret the case as being anti-homosexual, if not
sexually repressive. 115
The other Lords were more pragmatic in their reasoning, how-
ever. For example, Lord Jauncey's opinion drew heavily on the social
utility of the activity itself, avoiding the moral outrage argument and
focusing on the real risk of serious injury. He stated:
This House must therefore consider the possibility that these
activities are practiced by others and by others who are not
so controlled or responsible as the appellants are claimed to
be. Without going into details of all the rather curious activi-
ties in which the appellants engaged it would appear to be
good luck rather than good judgment which has prevented
serious injury from occurring. Wounds can easily become
septic if not properly treated, the free flow of blood from a
person who is positive or who has AIDS can infect an-
other and an inflicter who is carried away by sexual excite-
ment or by drink or drugs could easily inflict pain beyond
the level to which the receiver has consented .... When
considering the public interest, potential for harm is just as
relevant as actual harm, 116
Although there was no empirical evidence introduced that S/M activi-
ties do in fact result in these harms, Lord Jauncey found the state's
114 Brown, 1 A.C. at 236-37 (opinion of Lord Templeton).
115 See id; ESKRIDGE, SUPra note 36, at 236.
116 Brown, 1 A.C. at 245-62 (opinion of Lord Jauncey).
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argument persuasive that criminalizing S/M regardless of consent was
necessary to ensure the health and safety of the citizenry. 117
There have been few systematic studies of the effect of S/M on its
practitioners. 118 However, as William Eskridge notes, nobody who par-
ticipated in the S/M club in the Spanner case claimed to be abused,
and there was no evidence that any member of the club was a
sociopath or had ever been violent outside of the controlled club set-
ting. 119 Although in the absence of proof, arguments about social
harm are merely rhetorical, both the tone and substance of Lord
Jauncey's opinion suggests that the court is concerned with social
outcomes that transcend the particular facts of the case. The court
was worried about the slippery slope of allowing consensual violence
outside of a highly regulated sphere.
Both dissenting Lords argued that the case should be decided
not within the law of criminal violence, but within the law of private
sexual relations. Unconvinced by speculation about the potential
health risks of S/M or the remote possibility that youth could be cor-
rupted by such activity, the dissent found the majority's holding both
paternalistic and exceeding judicial power. Rather, Lord Mustill's dis-
sent argued that consent should be a presumptive defense to assault,
and that the state had not produced enough evidence to overcome
that presumption. 12°
The case took on international dimensions when the defendants
appealed to the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR"). 121 The
defendants argued that their conviction constituted an "interference
by a public authority" with the right to respect for their private life,
and asked the court to overturn their conviction under the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. The ECHR unanimously upheld the conviction. First, it
"7 See id. (opinion of Lord jauncey),
"6 See Kenneth N. Sandnabba et al., Sexual Behavior and Social Adoption Among Sado-
masochistically-Oriented Males, 36j. OF SEX Ras. 273 (1999) (finding that in a sample of 164
men who were members of two sadomasochistically-oriented clubs, the participants were
socially well-adjusted).
119 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 36, at 261.
120 See Brown, 1 A.C. at 256-75 (opinion of Lord Mustill).
121 Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms provides: "Everyone shall have the right to respect for his private
and family life, his home and his correspondence. There shall be no interference by a
public authority with the exercise of this right except in accordance with the law and as
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the pro-
tection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedom of others."
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suggested that while the videotapes were not sold for commercial use,
they were used to recruit new members, and questioned whether this
involved a case of privacy at al1. 122 Yet, even assuming that the acts
were private, the court likened the activities of the defendants to acts
of torture, 123 and found that the state was entitled to regulate activities
involving the infliction of physical harm, whether they occurred in
the course of sexual conduct or otherwise. 124 These were not trifling
or transient injuries, the court maintained:125 Rather, it found that the
state had prosecuted not based on the defendant's sexual orientation
or proclivities, but on the extreme nature of the practices themselves.
The court was clear to point out that it did not need to reach the issue
as to whether the state could regulate the activity based on moral
grounds; it found sufficient social utility reasons to let the decision
stand. 126
Admittedly, the Spanner case is sensational and rare. Good people
can and do disagree with both the House of Lords and the ECHR, at
least as applied to the particular facts of the case. 127 The defendants
did spend time in jail, and Eskridge has made a cogent argument that
the court was bound to invoke the rule of lenity rather than send
people to jail for private behavior that is not expressly prohibited by
statute. 128 Further, he argues that the prosecution was a misapplica-
tion of scarce prosecutorial resources. 129
Eskridge is correct that the facts of the case call into question the
motives behind the prosecution. Furthermore, S/M sex clubs can be
safe and highly regulated establishments:134 A strong argument can be
made that S/M confined to a club setting, according to clearly
122 See Laskey, 24 Eur. Ct. FIR. at 56-57 (noting that a considerable number of people
were involved in the activities, including the recruitment of new members and the shoot-
ing of videotapes, thus leaving open the question as to whether the sexual activities fell
entirely within the notion of a private life).
123 Id. at 57-58 ("[Slome of these acts could well be compared to acts of 'genital tor-
ture' and a Contracting State could not be said to have an obligation to tolerate acts of
torture because they are committed in the context of a consenting sexual relationship.").
For a broader discussion on human rights, SEC HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURE & CONTEXT:
ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (Richard A. Wilson ed., 1997).
124 Laskey, 24 Eur. Ct. II.R. at 58.
128 Id. at 59.
128 Id. at 60.
127 See, e.g., John Wadham, Consent to Assault, 196 NEW Lj., 1812,1812 (1996) (point-
ing out that while some argue that consent to assault would most endanger women, the
case is an affront to civil liberties).
128 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 36, at 262.
129 See id.
130 See id.
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defined rules and regulations, is analogous to prize fighting. Indeed,
Lord Mustill argued in the dissent that Parliament ought to decide
when an activity is dangerous, not the courts.'" Thus, legislators
could license S/M clubs, like the one in the Spanner case. This would
not at all be inconsistent with the sports exception.
The Spanner holding was legally sound, however. First, the Anglo-
American law as to consensual violence is quite clear that consent is
the exception and not the rule when one engages in activity that
could cause serious bodily injury or death. The exceptions to that rule
have been clearly defined, and S/M has never fallen within those ex-
ceptions. Second, the government does indeed have a legitimate in-
terest in confining violence. True, the Lords were puritanical in their
fear of people engaging in the unconstrained pursuit of their sexual
pleasure. But they were also concerned as to what would happen if
people were allowed to engage in unconstrained violent aggression.
What is troubling about this case is the age of the alleged victims, and
what appears to be a power imbalance between the parties, calling
into question whether there was consent at all.
The outcome of the case may have served no social utility, in the
end, but the long-term effects of allowing people to inflict serious in-
jury on others—at least outside of a highly regulated club environ-
ment—to be a defense to sexual assault may have been even worse.
Thus, the question is not what are the dangers of the law as it cur-
rently stands, but what would happen if the doctrine were reversed
and consent to assault and battery was allowed as a defense in cases
involving sexual as well as physical relationships. An analysis of these
cases suggests that there may be more, not less, backlash and dis-
crimination against people based on sexual orientation were the doc-
trine of consent extended to S/M.
B. Tie Me Up, Tie Me Down: The Feminist Response
The law's inability to perfectly promote sexual autonomy, on one
hand, and criminalize violence, on the other, masks a greater ambiva-
lence about sex and sexuality and presents particular dilemmas for
women. Just as in the sporting context, legal doctrines regulating sex
no longer allow for unrestrained physical male aggression. Rather,
physical force is becoming doctrinally distinct from consensual sex. In
both the case of rape and of domestic violence, the law, in some re-
"I See Brown,1 A.C. at 274 (Opinion of Lord Mustill).
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spects, imposes standards of civilized masculinity for intimate encoun-
ters. For example, historically rape was defined as including the ele-
ment of force or threat of force—the use of physical compulsion or
violence beyond the act of intercourse itself ' 32 In many jurisdictions,
this included the requirement that the victim physically resist to the
utmost, thus condoning the use of some violence by males in obtain-
ing sexual gratification.'" As the law evolved to account for the inher-
ent power differential between men and women, reasonable resis-
tance became sufficient in most states, and, among the most
progressive, no resistance is required at all" Rather, the lack of con-
sent, coupled with some physical sexual act, is sufficient in some juris-
dictions to satisfy the elements of rape. 1" By recognizing that a little
force is not always necessary, the law ensures that consent is not co-
erced, ensuring sexual autonomy by punishing physical violence.
A similar relationship between violence and sexual autonomy is
found in the criminal law's treatment of domestic violence. As Donna
Coker has noted, men who beat their wives or lovers frequently allege
that the woman's infidelity or her desire to be unfaithful provoked the
beating.'" In the case of domestic homicide, partners who perceive
that a loved one may stray are more likely to kill under the theory of
"if I can't have you, no one can." 1 37 When the law failed to sanction
men for acts of domestic violence, this, implicitly, at least, limited fe-
male sexual autonomy.'" The trend toward criminalizing domestic
violence promotes women's sexual agency and equality by distinguish-
ing physical violence from consensual intimacy. Imposing standards of
civilized masculinity hence promotes women's sexual autonomy.
Would allowing consent in the S/M context undermine sexual
equality? The law is intended to prevent the powerful from hurting
the powerless; by criminalizing S/M that results in injury, the law ar-
guably protects masochistic women from sadistic men who injure
132 See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 60-65, 69 (1987) (discussing the legal standard of
force in rape).
133 See STEPHENT SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEx 3 (1998) .
154 see id.
1 " See, e.g., In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992).
136 Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion Killing: Men Who Batter; Men Who Kill, 25. CAL, REV.
L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 71 (1992).
IS? DAVID M. Buss, THE DANGEROUS PASSION 101-30 (2000) (discussing the link be-
tween sexual jealousy and intimate violence).
I" See Cheryl Hanna, Can a Biological Inquiry Help Reduce Male Violence Against Females,
22 VT. L. REV. 333, 348-49 (1997); Barbara Smuts, Male Aggression Against Women: An Evolu-
tionary Perspective, in SEX, POWER, CONFLICT: EVOLUTIONARY & FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 231
(David M. Buss and Neil M. Malmuth eds., 1996).
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them in the course of non-consensual sexual relations, effectively
eliminating the "she likes it rough" defense. Thus, the law imposes
normative standards of sexual conduct on men that are non-violent
and non-dominating, again, civilized masculinity. At the same time,
the law limits women's pursuit of pleasure through pain, thus pre-
scribing normative behaviors that can be paternalistic and repressive.
The current doctrine of consent assumes that no reasonable woman
would or should consent to sexual activity that involves violent domi-
nation, just as it once assumed women had no right to play sports.
The current doctrine of consent also fails to recognize that
"rough sex" is not always victimizing to the masochist (generally the
woman in the paradigmatic heterosexual ritual). Some have even ar-
gued that sadomasochism can create avenues of empowerment for
the masochist as she becomes paradoxically stronger and the sadist
weaker. 139
 Thus, the inability of the law to distinguish between situa-
tions which are consensual and empowering and those that are hu-
miliating and victimizing presents an unresolved and unresolvable
dilemma.
The law must decide which horn of this dilemma is better (or less
bad), and to do so, must examine experience as well as theory. The
vast majority of S/M cases take place not in homosexual sex clubs, but
in private, between heterosexuals. 140
 A review of these cases suggests
that S/M is more often a guise invoked by defendants to explain away
their sexual battery and abuse, 141
 not a guise invoked by the state to
159 See, e.g., CHANGER, supra note 24.
140 See Apostolides, supra note 3, at 60 (citing Charles Moser of the Institute for Ad-
vanced Study of Human Sexuality that S/M is most popular among educated, middle and
upper class men and women).
141 See, e.g., Ohio v. Hardy, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4588 (1997). In that case, a hus-
band, disguised as a burglar, ,attacked his wife, blindfolded her, tied her to a chair, struck
her, and forced her to engage in oral and anal intercourse, claiming that it was part of
"fantasy role playing." On another occasion, he raped her at gunpoint, bound her legs,
handcuffed her, and attempted to put her in a bathtub with water that had an electrical
radio perched on edge, and then tried to suffocate her. He testified at trial that their mari-
tal sexual activity was "a little bit different than what most people would consider normal."
See id. In Ohio v. Roquemore, 85 Ohio App. 3d 448 (1993), the defendant admitted to
hitting the headboard of the bed with a baseball bat and started wrestling with the victim
until she started scratching him and then he laid on top of her, and had intercourse. The
victim became unconscious and died of cardiac stoppage, as well as suffering rectal and
vaginal trauma. The defendant claimed that this was all part of rough sex that the two had
had previously as well. See also People v. Hooker, 244 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1988) (Defendant, "an
advocate of bondage and discipline" kidnapped, with his wife, a twenty-year-old girl and
held her in a specially constructed "headbox", tortured her, whipped her, and held her
prisoner as his sexual slave for more than seven years.); Horowitz v. State, 1996 WL 112223
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persecute gay men. Even in those few cases where the victim refuses to
participate in the prosecution, more often than not, the facts of those
cases give rise to legitimate questions as to whether the victim con-
sented at all. The danger in allowing consent to negate an assault and
battery when the defendant claims S/M is that rape and domestic vio-
lence prosecutions could be greatly undermined.
L State v. Collier
Take, for example, the 1985 case of State v. Collier in which the
Iowa Court of Appeals was asked to decide whether sadomasochism
was a "social activity" pursuant to the Iowa Code and thus exempt
from an assault prosecution. 142 In this case, the defendant, Edward
"Tree" Collier, ran an outcall model business (i.e., he was a pimp).
The victim, Leann Steele, worked for him as a model (i.e., she was a
C` prostitute). According to Steele, when she returned one day without
any money after an all-day encounter with a customer with whom she
"did drugs," Collier got angry, locked the doors, and promised her a
birthday that she would never forget. Collier forced Steele to remove
her clothing and tied her spread-eagle face-up on the bed. He then
blindfolded her and proceeded to whip her with a belt. Steele
testified that she was struck on the thighs, legs and chest. When she
began crying and asked him to stop, he slapped her across the face
and gagged her. Defendant then performed sexual acts using various
types of paraphernalia. He eventually untied her, beat her on the
(Tex. Grim. App.) (Victim who arguably blacked out after consuming alcohol was allegedly
violated by the defendant, an attorney, who caused severe trauma too her vagina, cervix,
anus and rectum, but argued that the injuries were sustained during consensual "rough"
sex.); Ewing v. Texas, 1997 IA% 488614 (Tex. Grim. App.) (At gunpoint, defendant grabbed
the victim's arm, pulled her to the floor and told her he "was going to teach her a lesson
wanting to be a slut and work in a bondage and discipline bar," and then engaged in a
series of violent acts which included cutting her with a knife, beating her and inserting
objects in her rectum and vagina. Defendant claimed that she asked him to perform these
sadomasochistic acts on her.); Mendyk v. Florida, 545 80.2d 846 (Fla. 1989) (defendant.
grabbed! a female convenience store clerk, took her to a secluded area, tied her up and
sexually tortured her, and eventually killed her. At the penalty phase of the trial, the state
introduced magazines seized by the police from the defendant's residence which covered
themes including sadomasochism, slavery and bondage.); R. v. Welch, 101 C.C.C. (3d) 216
(1995) (defendant tied up his partner with scarves and his tie, poured baby oil on her,
beat her with a belt, inserted his finger in her vagina and an object in her rectum. Defen-
dant claimed that the victim agreed tot his kind of sadomasochistic sex and asked for it).
142 See 372 N.W2d 303 (Iowa O. App. 1985) (citing IOWA CODE § 708.1 which provides
"What the person doing any of the above acts [defining assault], and such other person,
are voluntary participants in a sport, social or other activity, not in itself criminal the
act shall not be an assault").
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backside and proceeded to have anal intercourse with her. As a result
of the beating and the sexual acts, Steele suffered a swollen lip, large
welts on her ankles, wrists, hips, and buttocks, and severe bruising on
her thighs. 143
In contrast, Collier testified that Steele asked him to tie her up
and beat her in order to celebrate her birthday, as it was one of her
sexual fantasies. He further testified that she had read books concern-
ing bondage and instructed him on what to do. The court cited both
Samuels and Appleby in holding that the legislature never intended sa-
domasochism to be a "sport, social, or other activity." However, it did
not define the precise definition of this term, opting for a case-by-case
approach.' 44 What is striking about Collier is that, again, the victim in
this case was someone whom a jury could have found deserving of a
beating, or at least not worthy of the protection of the law. She was a
prostitute and a drug addict, and arguably sexually deviant by the na-
ture of her profession. If the issue of consent was allowed to go to the,''
jury, it may have found that she did so, given her status. Here, the
practical effect of the doctrine is to check the passions and prejudices
of the jury, who may in fact believe that prostitutes, like gay men, are
sexual deviants, undeserving of the law's protection. Were the court
to have come to the opposite conclusion, it would have given license
to pimps and johns to beat and rape prostitutes, and then claim S/M.
Even worse, had it allowed consent to be a defense, the court would
have implied that there are "good girls" and "bad girls" and that "bad
girls" get what they deserve, just as when, as a legal matter, prostitutes
could not be raped.
Hence, both the ECHR and Lord Jauncey are correct that it is
not enough to engage in a case-by-case analysis as to consent because
there are social consequences to carving out an "S/M exception" be-
yond the parties in any one case. There are social messages implicit in
any legal rule, and long-term consequences that far outlive the par-
ticulars of any case. By refusing to define S/M as a "social activity," the
Iowa court in effect protects those who could otherwise be defined as
sexually deviant and protects against what some have called a "cult of
violence."145 The court exercises it paternalistic function to protect
143 Collier, 372 N.W.2d at 309.
144 See id. at 307.
143 See WILL/AM STACEY & ANSON SHUPE, THE FAMILY SECRET: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN
AMERICA 196 (1983) ("[Wle think there is good reason to believe that a cult of violence is
spreading throughout our society and affecting every sector. [The cult is not an organized
group rather it] is an acceptance of violence, learning to expect it, to tolerate it, and to
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against violent anarchy, and, in the process, sets forth a code of con-
duct that protects those once deemed unworthy of protection, again
reinforcing a norm of civilized masculinity.
2. Regina v. Emmett
People often experiment with dangerous activities without know-
ing what they are doing, making the risk of injury highly probable.
This was precisely the problem in Regina v. Emmett, 146 another British
case decided after Regina v. Brown. The case involved a heterosexual
couple who were living together and subsequently married by the
time of trial so that the wife was able to invoke spousal privilege and
refuse to testify. 147 The defendant was charged under the Offenses
Against Person Act of 1861, the same statute under which the defen-
dants in Brown were charged. The case came to the attention of the
police after the "victim's" doctor reported that one of his patients had
suffered injuries that gave him cause for concern.
There were two instances that gave rise to the allegations. In the
first instance, the defendant placed a plastic bag over his partner's
head, tied it at the neck with a ligature, and tightened it to the point
where she could no longer endure the pain. This is a practice known
as erotic-asphyxiation, which is intended to heighten the sexual
pleasure for both parties. He engaged in oral sex with her, and at
some point became so lost in his own excitement that he lost track of
what was happening to her. He eventually became aware that she was
unable to speak, having lost oxygen. He removed the bag, and al-
though she lost consciousness, she remained alive. The following day
she went to see her doctor. She suffered from a subconjunctival hem-
orrhage in both eyes and had bruising around her neck—both caused
by lack of blood flow to the bead. It was clear that if the episode had
continued, she could have suffered brain damage and eventually
death. A few weeks later she returned to the doctor's office. On this
occasion, the defendant had poured lighter fluid on her and lit it—
again to heighten sexual pleasure. She suffered a burn on her breast
commit it, however much one dreads it. This cult is stimulated by a violent environment
that affects each generation of men and women, making them yet more desensitized to the
problem.").
146 See Regina v. Stephen Roy Emmett; [1999] E.W.C.A. 2651 (June 18, 1999), at
hup://www.hailii.org/ew/cases/DAVA/1999/2651.11tml.
"7 See id. at. II 5-6.
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that became infected, although because she sought immediate medi-
cal help, she had no permanent scarring. 148
Her doctor notified the police and the state arrested the defen-
dant. He admitted to these acts, claiming that they were consensual
sexual activities, although he did say that he was the one who initiated
the idea to engage in S/M. He was convicted based on his own state-
ments and the testimony of the doctor and sent given a suspended
sentence. He appealed. The appellate court rejected his argument
that this case was different from Brown in that it involved a heterosex-
ual couple. 149 The defendant further argued that his case was analo-
gous to Regina v. Wilson, 150 in which a husband had branded his wife's
buttock with his initials, at her request. In that case, the court dis-
missed his conviction, suggesting that Brown did not apply to consen-
sual activity between husband and wife whei-e there was no injury
greater than that of a tattoo. 151 In distinguishing Emmett from Wilson,
the appellate division of the criminal court of England held that here
the injuries were qualitatively different and noted that a number of
people had died in the last few years of erotic-asphyxiation. Emmett's
activities objectively revealed a realistic risk of more than just a tran-
sient or trivial injury. This was not merely rough and undisciplined
love play, but involved dangerous undertakings that carried a high
likelihood of harm. 182
Was the court correct in disallowing consent as a defense here?
Even assuming the "victim" enthusiastically and willingly consented,
the court here did the right thing. Activities such as erotic-
asphyxiation and burning are very high-risk endeavors, and in the
course of sexual excitement, it is quite easy to be overcome by pas-
sion. By disallowing consent, the court facilitates two important policy
goals. First, it protects the victim if she did not consent. We have no
way of knowing if the victim, like many abused women, was afraid to
testify, or if she was a loyal sex partner standing by her man. But more
importantly, it serves as a deterrent to those people who "play" but do
not know the rules. Mr. Emmett would not have been prosecuted if he
• did not cause injury, as there would have been no •evidence upon
which to base his conviction. Thus, the law sends a symbolic message
to proceed cautiously and carefully—do not play with fire—for if you
148 See id. at	 11.
'49 Id. ati 23.
1 " 1997 Q.B. 47 (Eng. CA.).
151 see id.
1152 See Entmell, [19991 E.W.C.A. at 29.
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do, and someone is injured, you will be criminally culpable. Even if
the defendant intended no harm, even if he knew the rules, he was
no doubt grossly reckless in his conduct. Some people do accidentally
die from S/M encounters that go too far, and hence, there is a clear
public safety argument to be made in cases that involve asphyxiation,
burning, and bondage, which, in rare cases, can also lead to death.'"
3. People v. Jovanovic
Before engaging in any sexual intimacy, both parties should con-
sent. Yet, discerning when consent is withdrawn poses particular prob-
lems for the law in S/M. In S/M, force and resistance is part and par-
cel of the encounter. "No" actually means "yes." Pain and pleasure
become indistinguishable. Being bad is being good. People v. Jovanovic,
initially discussed in the Introduction, pushes at the edge of consent.
It is a hard case, and hence a bad case for either side of this debate to
hold up as an example of what is right or wrong with the current doc-
trine of violent consent. In most S/M cases involving heterosexual
couples the question of consent becomes a "he said-she said" inquiry.
In Jovanovic, however, there was independent evidence of consent be-
yond the defendant's testimony. The victim, a Barnard College un-
dergraduate, was not a novice to the world of S/M. Rather, through
her e-mail exchanges with Jovanovic, it is clear that she at least knew
the language of S/M. Second, by her own testimony, she consented to
some activity with Jovanovic—but as her e-mail fantasies became real-
ity, she found herself at first ambivalent and then afraid. Furthermore,
Jovanovic is not a pimp or a careless lover or a homosexual man in-
volved in an underground S/M 'sex scene—he is an Ivy-educated
graduate student.
Jovanovic illustrates the extreme difficulty in S/M cases of discern-
ing what consent even means. Even those who initially consent to S/M
encounters, as did the complainant in this case, can change their
minds, unaware of what exactly it is that they are getting into, particu-
larly with a first time partner. Furthermore, although proponents of
153 In a recent case in Quincy, Massachusetts, for example, Barbara Asher, a self-
identified dominatrix, admitted to police that after her client, Michael Lord, died of a
heart attack while in restraints in her dungeon, she and her boyfriend chopped up the
body and disposed of the remains in a Dumpster. See David Wedge & J.M. Lawrence,
Woman in S&M Case No Longer Viroriting with Cops, BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 18, 2000, at 3. 'This
case reportedly sent women sex workers underground, fearing that they might become the
target of a police crackdown, See J.M. Lawrence & David Wedge, S&'M Pros Lay Low in the
Sex Death Fallout, BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 17, 2000, at 21.
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S/M stress the role of negotiation and communication, the facts of
fovanovic indicate that the meaning of consent was, at best, ambigu-
ous. What started as .consensual S/M arguably became sexual vio-
lence.
A detailed analysis of the facts shows why this is such a bad case.
According to the victim, after arriving at Jovanovic's apartment, he
gave her some tea, which she found to have a chemical taste. They
then looked at a book and watched a movie, both of which depicted
violent sex scenes. They talked. He asked her to take off her sweater
and her pants and she complied. She did not protest when he tied her
arms and legs spread-eagle on a futon frame. Jovanovic went to the
kitchen and came back with some candles, including a white candle in
a glass. The complainant protested, asking him not to burn her and to
be untied. When the glass was full of molten wax, he poured it on her
stomach, then pulled down her panties and dripped wax around her
vaginal area, and then onto her nipples. He then placed ice cubes
where he had poured the wax. She screamed and asked him to stop.
She was then blindfolded.
After about an hour of this, he untied her and carried her to his
bed. She asked him not to rape, dismember or kill her. When he
asked, "Is there anything else that you don't want me to do, she an-
swered, "Yes, don't do anything that you can get arrested for." When
he responded, "Do you think that I am going to get arrested for this?"
the complainant replied that he would have to kill her if he did not
want to get arrested. At this point, he said, "That's easily enough
done," and pinched her nose shut and put his hand over her mouth
for a minute until she felt dizzy.
He told her that she needed to learn self-defense and that the
only victim who had escaped Jeffrey Dahmer was proficient in martial
arts. He hog-tied her so that she was on her stomach. He next re-
trieved two batons from the closet, and penetrated her rectum with
either a baton or his penis, causing her intense pain. She next re-
membered waking up sometime the following morning. He untied
her and tried to give her self-defense lessons, and when she tried to
run away, he tied her up again. Eventually she freed herself, fought
him off, got her clothes and left.
The day after the encounter, Jovanovic e-mailed her again, saying
that she had left her gold chain in his apartment. He also said, "I have
the feeling the experience may not have done as much good as I'd
hoped, because you weren't acting much smarter at the end than you
were at the beginning." She replied that she was "purged by emotions,
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and pain," and that while she was "quite bruised mentally and physi-
cally" she was "never so happy to be alive."
After the victim reported him to the police, Jovanovic was
charged and convicted of kidnapping, sexual abuse and assault, which
created some doctrinal difficulty for the court. The New York Su-
preme Court, Appellate Division opinion makes clear that consent is a
defense to kidnapping and sexual abuse and thus the e-mails are rele-
vant to Jovanovic's state of mind as to the reasonableness of his own
belief that the victim was consenting. They also show the victim's state
of mind as to whether she did consent, calling into question her
credibility. The victim apparently admitted in the e-mails that she was
involved in another relationship with someone. She wrote, "[Me was
a sadomasochist and now I'm his slave and its (sic) painful, but the
fun of telling my friends `hey I'm a sadomasochist' more than out-
weighs the torment." 154 She later wrote in response to Jovanovic's
question as to whether she was submissive sometimes, "I am what
those happy pain fiends at the vault call a 'pushy bottom: 955 Thus,
the court is correct that these e-mails are relevant to the issue of con-
sent and suggest why the complainant may have motive to fabricate
non-consent as to the sexual assault and kidnapping charges.
But what about the assault and battery charge? Jovanovic never
took the stand, and thus his attorney did not suggest that Jovanovic
admitted to the encounter, but that, if he did, he should still be able
to show that the victim consented as to all charges, including the as-
sault and battery charge. The court agreed and held that "upholding
the conviction on the assault charges, as the dissent suggests, would
ignore the prejudice resulting from Jovanovic's inability to adequately
challenge the complainant's credibility and reliability." 156
In a footnote, the court rejected the defendant's argument that
there is a constitutional right to engage in S/M and qualified this
holding stating:
There is no available defense of consent on the charge of as-
sault.. . . Indeed, while a meaningful distinction can be
made between an ordinary violent beating and violence in
which both parties voluntarily participate for their own se3i-
1 "Joyanovic I, 700 N.Y.S.2d 156, 164 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
155 Id. at n. 4 ("The defense explains that The Vault is a club catering to sadomaso-
chists, and a "pushy bottom" is a submissive partner who pushes the dominant partner to
inflict greater pain.").
155 Id. at 171-72.
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ual gratification, nevertheless, . . . a person cannot avoid
criminal liability for an assault that causes injury or carries
with it a risk of serious harm, even if the victim asked for or
consented to the act. . . . And, although it may be possible to
engage in criminal assaultive behavior that does not result in
physical injury, we need not address whether consent to such
conduct may constitute a defense, since the jury clearly
found here that the complainant was physically injured. 157
There is a complete logical disconnect between this statement and the
court's holding. Jovanovic never claimed that the injuries the victim
sustained were inflicted by someone other than himself, and there was
corroborating testimony from a neighbor who heard sounds as if
"someone was undergoing a root canal." 158
 Furthermore, the com-
plaining witness promptly told five people about the encounters, and
some observed her injuries. In addition, the complainant went to a
hospital. Lab results on her clothing corroborated injury. She was
bruised and suffered burns from candle wax, and was physically re-
strained for an extended period of time. These injuries go far beyond
a little love play that just got out of hand.
If consent is not a defense to assault, what legal relevance do the
e-mails have to the assault and battery charge? Arguably none. The e-
mails in no way disprove that she was either not injured, or that
someone other than Jovanovic caused the injuries. The dissent cor-
rectly points out that her corroborated testimony was sufficient as a
matter of law to uphold the assault charges and that the trial court's
instruction that consent was not a valid defense to that charge was
proper. 159
 By not separating out the sexual abuse and kidnapping
charges from the assault charge, and thus reversing the entire convic-
tion, the Appellate Division implicitly suggests that the jury could
have found that she consented to the violence that was part of a sex-
ual encounter.
The majority is doctrinally sloppy in its analysis and too quick to
reverse the entire conviction. What is striking is that, unlike in Collier,
where the court passed no moral judgment on the prostitute, here the
court is skeptical and judgmental of a young college woman who
might be curious about S/M. In taking issue with the fact that jovano-
157 Id. at 168 n. 5 (internal citations omitted).
I" Id. at 174 (Mazzarelli,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
l" See id.
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vic was portrayed as a monstrous sadist, while the complainant was
portrayed as a naive and innocent girl, the court stated:
The excluded e-mails stating that the complainant and Luke
[another man] had a master-slave relationship that included
the infliction of pain, and that the e-mail in which the com-
plainant referred to "the pain fiends at the vault" and herself
as a "pushy bottom," i.e. a masochist who pushes the domi-
nant partner to inflict more pain than intended, would have
enabled Jovanovic to provide a counterpoint to the People's
portrayal of the complainant and avoid the prejudice poten-
tially created by the unbalanced portrayal. It would also have
permitted Jovanovic to effectively place the complainant in a
somewhat less innocent, and possibly more realistic, light.
For instance, the complainant made certain remarks in her
e-mails, such as "rough is good," and "dirt I find quite
erotic," for which she provided the jury with completely in-
nocent explanations. Defendant was unable to plausibly of-
fer alternative, more suggestive readings of such e-mail re-
marks, as long as the jury was unaware of the extent of the
complainant's interest in sadomasochism. 16°
Here the court suggests that "she asked for it, she got it," or that she
at least should have known better. It is a classic "blame the victim" de-
cision. The court is clearly repulsed by her interest in S/M, and is far
more sympathetic to a "good young man" than to a "bad college girl."
The New York Court of Appeals was intellectually lazy in uphold-
ing the Appellate Division's opinion. In two short sentences, they held
that because the e-mails are admissible under the "interests of justice"
exception to the Rape Shield Law, they had no authority to over-
turn. 161 Yet, the court failed to explain how the e-mails would be rele-
vant to the assault charge, and, as such, now opens the door for other
defendants charged with both sexual abuse and physical assault to in-
troduce evidence of consent as to both charges by invoking the S/M
defense.
16° Id. at 200-01.
161 Jovanovic II, 95 N.Y.S.2d 846 (2000) ("Motion to dismiss appeal granted and appeal
dismissed upon the ground that the reversal of the Appellate Division was not on the law
alone or upon the law and such facts which, but for the determination of the law, would
not have led to reversal. Although the order states that the reversal is on the law, the opin-
ion reveals that an independent ground for reversal was the applicability of the CLP60.45
(5) 'interests ofjnstice' exception to the Rape Shield Law.").
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In the vast majority of cases where defendants have invoked con-
sensual S/M as defense to a sexual assault charge, other courts have
consistently held that evidence that the victim may have been inter-
ested in or engaged in S/M in the past is barred under Rape Shield
Laws. 162 The Appellate Division breaks with precedent not only on
questions of substantive criminal law, but on the applicability of evi-
dentiary issues as well. Even more appalling is that both the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals failed to engage in any historical or
doctrinal analysis of consensual violence itself and the relationship
between sexual and nonsexual violence. They would have been well
advised to consult both Brown and Jobidon before rendering an opin-
ion.
The New York County District Attorney's Office has said that it
will retry the case, a decision that has incited public controversy. 165
Many believe that it was Jovanovic, and not the complainant, who was
the victim, and that the District Attorney is being over-zealous, anti-
male, and sexually puritanical. 164 After the decision, the District At-
torney's office offered Jovanovic a no-jail sentence if he plead guilty.
Already having spent more than twenty months in jail, Jovanovic re-
fused, claiming that the sex was consensual. 165 This decision, and the
public reaction to it, ought to give pause to those who understand
that the costs of a system of unrestricted freedom fall most directly on
women, who are at most risk for abuse and exploitation. 166
162 See, e.g., People v. Murphy, 919 P.2d 191 (Colo. 1996) (Colorado Rape Shield Stat-
ute barred evidence of victim's sexual orientation or that the victim had agreed to try
some "rough sex"); State v. Stevens, 1995 Del. Super. LEXIS 294 (victim's preference for
"rough sex" inadmissible under Delaware Rape Shield Statute); State v. Miller, 600 N.W.2d
55 (Wisc. 1999) (questioning victim as to whether she ever engaged in rough sex was in
error under Wisconsin Rape Shield Statute). See also Roger Park, The Crime Bill of 1994 and
the Law of Character Evidence: Congress Was Right About Consent Defense Cases, 22 FORM-TAM
Uses. L.J. 271 (1995); Clifford S. Fishman, Consent, Credibility, and the Constitution: Evidence
Relating to a Sex Offense Complainant's Past Sexual Behavior, 94 CATE!. U. L. REV. 709 (1995);
Rosemary C. Hunder, Gender in Evidence: Masculine Norms v. Feminist Reforms, 19 HARM.
WOMEN'S L.J. 127 (1996).
163 Kenneth Lovett et al., Cyber 011ie Now Faced with New Trial, N. Y. POST, July 7, 2000, at
2.
161 See, e.g., Robyn E. Mummer, Rape Shield Laws Have Outlived Their Usefulness and
Should be Shelved, SALT LAKE CITY TRIB., Jan. 7, 2000, at All.
165 Laura Italiano, Cybersex Suspect Nixes Deal, N.Y. POST, Dec. l4, 2000, at 12.
166 See SCI4ULHOFER, supra note 133, at 278.
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4. In a Bind
Yet, S/M, in theory, need not offend feminist sensibilities when
one begins with the premise that it is an activity rooted in sexual
autonomy. Thus, for example, the National Organization of Women
("NOW") has started an S/M policy reform project to reverse the or-
ganization's stance against the practice as dehumanizing to women,
instead arguing that it promotes physical and sexual expression. 167
Sex and erotic desire can be positive and liberating for women, and
some have argued that the question of S/M is intricately related to
issues such as abortion and access to birth control, fundamentally be-
ing a question of sexual autonomy, not sexual violence. 168
Furthermore, many women in same-sex relationships embrace
the practice of S/M, and thus the demarcation between man as sadist
and woman as masochist is blurred. 169 Frotn this liberal, autonomous
feminist perspective, women, like men, can freely make decisions. In-
deed, there are both sociall" and biological'?' reasons as to why both
receiving and inflicting pain on another is pleasurable and desirable
for both women and men. By stigmatizing S/M, the law implicitly
pathologizes women and denies them the same sexual agency that
men have. Just as in the Spanner case, the Paddleboro case, discussed
in the Introduction, raises the issue as to whether the law of S/M will
now be used to persecute women who are involved in same sex rela-
tions. It remains to be seen whether this is an isolated incident or an
emerging pattern but the fear remains that women may be once again
denied sexual agency through selective prosecution or restraints on
sexual agency
167 See NOW S/M Policy Reform Project at hup://members.aolcom/NOWSM/honte.
bunt (visited Feb. 2, 2000) (describing an ad hoc group of members of NOW who support
freedom of sexual expression for consenting' adults, inspired by caucus discussions held at
NOW's Lesbian Rights Summit).
100 See id.
150 See generally Mary Becker, Women, Morality, es' Sexual Orientation, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S
L.J. 165 (1998) (arguing that heterosexual relationships are more problematic for women
than are lesbian relationships).
170 See, e.g., CHANGER, supra note 24; LYNDA HART, BETWEEN THE BODY & THE FLESH:
PERFORMING SADOMASOGII/SM (1998); JOHN MUNDER Ross, THE SADOMASOCHISM OF EVE-
RYDAY LIFE (1997); STUDIES IN DOMINANCE & SUBMISSION (ThOMBS S. Weinberg, ed.)
(1995).
in See, e.g., David Tuber, Probing. the Limits of Pain & Pleasure, SAN FRAN. CHRON., June
29, 1997, at 3Z1 (quoting Dossie Easton, a therapist, advocate for battered women and
aficionado of sadomasochism, "Runner's high is a good example of something that might
be close to what people gel out of the S/M stimulus. People's endorphin systems kick in—
endorphins are the opiates that your body naturally produces.").
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In addition, the case law represents only a tiny portion of the
range of S/M experiences. While traditionally we think of males as
sadists and women as masochists, the world of S/M twists and plays
with power relationships. Consider the following interview by Lauren
Goodlad with two women who each work as a dominatrix:
Lady Alfonsa describes herself as a therapist, not a sex
worker. Since 1991 she and her partner, Mistress Midori,
have built up a cottage industry in domination-for-hire.
Their "toys"—the men and women who employ their serv-
ices—are bound, disciplined, and punished. Most are suc-
cessful professionals in positions of authority.
"If it is not sex that you are providing," I ask, "why do they
come to you?"
"They want to be controlled," Alfonsa replies.
"They want," Midori says, "to be brought to the breaking
point—especially the men."
"And what is that breaking point?" I ask.
Midori reflects for a moment.
"Usually when they cry."172
This interview illustrates that power and powerlessness are mutable;
they are not gender specific or role specific. 173 The argument that
S/M is a male construct does not fully account for the many roles that
people play. Males may indeed crave a sense of powerlessness, just as
women can crave power. From this perspective, then, S/M promotes,
not inhibits, women's sexual agency.
In contrast, some "regulatory" feminists, such as Andrea Dworkin
and Catharine MacKinnon, argue that consent is illusory within a
male dominated context as the social system serves to make women
subordinate. 174 Within the context of S/M, there could be no consent,
even if a woman says yes, given the misogynistic and violent patriar-
02 Goodlad, supra note 23, at 35; see also David Wedge & J.M. Lawrence, Woman in
Sev'M Case No Longer Working with Cops, BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 18,2000, at 3.
173 See also Harold Levy, Sex Isn't S/M Goal, TORONTO STAR, July 28,1998, at B3. The ar-
ticle describes the trial of "Made de Sade," a dominatrix who was arrested after police
raided her "Chamber of Erotica." Dr. Roy Baumeister, a psychologist at Case Western Re-
serve University, testified that it is often older white men who are drawn to sadomaso-
chism, often wanting to be spanked and dominated. "It is separation from real life for
them." Id.
174 See generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 36 at 254-55; ANDREA DWORKIN, THE RooT
CAUSE IN OUR BLOOD: PROPHECIES & DISCOURSE ON SEXUAL POLITICS 96-111 (1976);
CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARDS A FEMINIST THEORY 01."I'HE STATE 126-54 (1982).
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chal culture in which we live. Consent is merely an expression of the
"false consciousness of the oppressed."'" Thus, "that women on occa-
sion take pleasure in their own submissiveness, is simply a manifesta-
tion of their disempowered state."'"
Others reject the idea that sadomasochistic encounters are in-
formed by open negotiations. "It is rather more likely that the partici-
pation in sadomasochism is predetermined to varying degrees so that
the ritual of consent is empirically irrelevant."'" And there is at least
anecdotal evidence to suggest that some people often agree to engage
in some form of S/M, only to regret it later. 1" For many, there is a
clear gender distinction between men's and women's experience with
pleasure and pain. As Robin West has argued, "Women's subjective,
hedonic lives are different from men's. The quality of our suffering is
different from that of men's, as is the nature of our joys.. .. Women
suffer more than do men."
The problem, then, from a feminist perspective, is that there is
no one perspective on S/M. Both liberal and regulatory feminists
point to both the good and the bad of S/M for women. S/M is hard
for feminists, as it is unclear whether it promotes sexual agency or
promotes sexual exploitation or both. In practice, whether S/M is an
exercise of individual autonomy or social coercion is far more de-
pendent on the particulars of the situation. It may very well be that
within same-sex female relationships, the concerns over power and
exploitation are less salient's° Furthermore, even the context of Jova-
175 Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of
Feminist Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 149, 186 (2000) (discussing MacKinnon and
Dworkin).
176 Id. at 184 (discussing differences between radical feminism and radical feminist le-
gal theory).
177 Robin Ruth Linden, Introduction, AGAINST SADOMASOCHISM 9, (Robin Ruth Linden,
et al. eds.,1982).
178 SeeTwyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993). In that case, a wife sued a hus-
band in divorce for the intentional infliction of emotional distress for pursing sadomaso-
chistic activities with her. See id. In Fielder v, Texas, initially a wife consented to "playful"
bondage and discipline games with her husband, but then he forced her to participate in
activities such as piercing her genitals and shackling her nude to metal rings in a closet he
called "the cave." The couple separated, and later Ms. Fielder killed her husband in what
she argued was a case of self-defense. See 756 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). See also
Marissa kind, Letter from a Former Masochist, in AGAINST SADOMASOCHISM, supra note 177, at
16-22 (providing a statement from a lesbian who used to practice S/M describing it as a
cover to encourage women to be violent).
in West, supra note 175, at 149.
15° See generally Becker, supra note 169; PAT CALIFIA & ROBIN SWEENY, THE SECOND
COMING: A LEATIIERDYKE READER (1996).
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novic, the complainant felt, in her own words, simultaneously liber-
ated and oppressed. What makes fovanovic such a bad case for femi-
nists is that we want her to be both free from social restraints to ex-
plore her sexuality, and we want the law to set boundaries for her
sexual partner and, to some extent, herself. Yet, it becomes impossible
to have it both ways—tied up and tied down.
Even if one is theoretically persuaded by liberal feminist argu-
ments that consent can be real and that, for many women, S/M actu-
ally promotes, not punishes, women's sexual pleasure, at some point
the law must draw lines. Not even liberal feminists would suggest that
it would be acceptable to inflict death or to maim someone for some
sort of sexual gratification. Thus, the question is not whether the
broad concept of S/M is good/bad for women, but rather, how far is
too far? 181
Professor Stephen Shulhofer has argued in Unwanted Sex:
The effort to distinguish permitted from prohibited force
pulls the law into a hopeless quagmire, with under-
enforcement the inevitable result. But this problem can't be
solved by moving the line between the two kinds of force to a
slightly different place. What is perhaps more surprising, and
certainly more frustrating, this problem can't be solved by
prohibiting all uses of force. That approach won't avoid the
vagaries of distinguishing permitted from impermissible
force, because physical activity, some of it forcible, is inher-
ent in intercourse. And many of the other physical aspects of
sexuality, though not inherent in intercourse, are expected
and pleasurable, provided that there is consent. 182
True, to prohibit all force would be ridiculous. But giving consent a
legal definition that embodies the notion of negotiation, qualitative
and informed decision-making will not necessarily make for a better
legal regime of sexual autonomy either. Inevitably, the law will find
itself in somewhat of a quagmire within the S/M context, deciding on
a case-by-case basis how far is too far and when the risk of serious in-
jury and death is too great. In this context, the law must not only bal-
m For example, a recent case in San Diego highlights how far can be too far in the
private pursuit of pleasure. John Ronald Brown was convicted of second-degree murder
after lie amputated the leg of a man to satisfy a sexual fetish. SeeJ. Harry Jones, Unlicensed
. Doctor Gets 15 Yeats in the Death of a Man After the Amputation of Leg SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, Dec. 18,1999, at 134.
182 SCHULHOFER, supra note 166, at 279.
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ance sexual agency with concern for coerced choices, but it must fac-
tor in the level of violent aggression, even if consensual, that the state
will tolerate. As soon as women, in particular, start to embrace vio-
lence that is outside of a competitive, regulated sphere, they will no
doubt find that they once again will become the victim, and not the
victors, in the struggle for sexual autonomy and equality.
If S/M that resulted in actual serious physical injury were to be
decriminalized, there would no doubt be a series of consequences,
intended and unintended. For example, if the law of consensual vio-
lence mirrored the law of consensual sex, a defendant could not be
held criminally culpable if his belief that the victim consented was
both honest and reasonable. Many commentators have argued that
reasonableness has a social tneaning,"3 or as one court stated, "It is
time to put to rest the societal myth that when a man is about to en-
gage in sexual intercourse with a 'nice' woman, a little force is always
liecessary."1184 Force and resistance are often evidentiary as well as le-
gal standards by which the reasonableness is measured. Thus, if a vic-
tim is physically injured in the course of a sexual encounter, the force
applied by the defendant often negates the reasonableness of his be-
lief in consent, as we assume that reasonable people cannot and do
not consent to being beaten. Physical injury is often the only evi-
dence, beyond the victim's testimony, that proves the element of non-
consent. It is far easier to prosecute a rape case when the victim is in-
jured than it is if she has sustained no bodily injury at all.
In contrast, in the S/M context, force and resistance are actually
consented to by the parties. And thus, in almost every sexual encoun-
ter the defendant could argue that he was reasonable in believing that
the other person consented to injury. Even if the victim withdraws
consent by shouting no, no means yes. Even if she struggles and is in-
jured, pain is the ultimate cathartic experience. If consent were al-
lowed as a defense in the S/M context, defense attorneys would have
carte blanche to raise it in every sexual assault case where the victim is
injured. This would essentially gut rape law jurisprudence as it now
stands. So too could defense attorneys raise the S/M defense in many
cases of domestic violence, undermining the slow and steady strides
the law has made in sanctioning male violence.
I83 See, e.g., Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed f Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair
Thal in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1013 (1991).
184 State s/. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981).
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If courts extended the consent doctrine to S/M, not only could
this in practice be used to justify violence against women, but it could
also, at a more theoretical and abstract level, reinforce oppressive cul-
tural norms. It is notable that the literature on S/M rarely makes any
reference to race. Indeed, the mainstreaming of S/M seems to be tak-
ing place among the upper middle class, which is predominately
white. The language of S/M—slave, master, bondage, domination—
may have a particular meaning within consensual sexual activities, but
it derives from a history of legal racism and slavery. It is important to
understand the multiple and complex meaning of these concepts and
why, for some at least, the whole notion of S/M could be considered
dehumanizing when examined within a larger cultural context.
For centuries, racial sadists abused their powers to inflict pain on
slaves. 185
 Many arguments about maintaining slavery were premised
on the assumption that slaves preferred it that way. The dynamic of
slavery is the same dynamic of power and powerlessness in sadomaso-
chistic relationships, in many respects, even though in the latter we
presume consent. 186
 Within this historical context, we must ask our-
selves if (white) America's fascination with S/M is not more deeply
rooted in a collective cultural consciousness that still assumes women
and racial minorities should be subservient to white men. Consider
that S/M fantasies often involve the binding and whipping of the
"slave" by the "master," evoking the image of white slave owners disci-
plining slaves in Antebellum America. 187 There are implications to
opening up the Pandora's Box of consensual violence, not the least of
which is that it sends a symbolic message that some forms of sexual
oppression are acceptable so long as the oppressed party says yes)"
Perversions of S/M, or not by-the-book S/M, can have horrible
dehumanizing results, affronting concepts of human respect and dig-
nity. Take, for example, the case of John Edward Robinson)" Going
183 CHANCER, supra note 24, at 24.
186 See id. at 169-71.
187
 For a description of an S/M scene depicting a "slave" being whipped by a "master,"
see West, supra note 175, at 188-90 (quoting M. MARCUS, A TASTE FOR PAIN: ON MASO-
CHISM AND FEMALE SEXUALITY 204-10 (1981) ("[s]ome people ... are born into inequal-
ity and bondage and can only be happy by losing their false freedom and equality and
giving themselves over to submissiveness and slavery.")).
Dm William F. McDonald, The Role of the Victim in America, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL
295,295-96 (Randy E. Barney & John Hagel III eds., 1977) ("The criminal justice system is
not for [the crime victim's' benefit, but for the community's. Its purposes are to deter
crime, to rehabilitate criminals, punish criminals, and to do justice ... .").
189 See Tim Ilrenchir, KB! Ries to Snare Suspects On Web, TOPEKA CAPITAL-JOURNAL, July
3,2000, at Al,
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by the name of "Slavemaster," Robinson would strike up Internet rela-
tionships with women interested in sadomasochism.'" When two
women traveled to meet him face-to-face, both claimed that he brutal-
ized them far beyond what they had intended. Upon his arrest, a
search of his property turned up two dead women. Later, three more
bodies were found in his storage locker. Robinson had also been in
another relationship with a woman who had allegedly signed a "slave
contract," for which she paid him $17,000. True, Robinson is nothing
more than a serial killer who used the Internet as a way to find vic-
tims. He represents a new kind of cyber-sex criminal, something
which has given the Justice Department great pause for concern. 191
But apart from his ability to lure women to him under the guise of
S/M, what about the "sex slave" contract he had with another woman?
Enforceable? Sexual slavery violates human rights 192 and sexual slav-
ery contracts are arguably void on public policy grounds.'"
Ill. BOUND TO THE LAW
In no way should this argument be construed as a moral judg-
ment on those who practice safe and consensual S/M and are careful
and communicative with their partners. Many people who engage in
S/M follow clear rules and guidelines, which include that one cannot
drink or do drugs or anything else that could impair one's judgment.
Indeed, many questions surrounding violation of sexual autonomy in
the course of an acquaintance or date rape situation would be far
more easily answered if everyone engaged in similar negotiations,
made clear when yes meant no and no meant yes, and refrained from
the excessive use of drugs and alcohol. Furthermore, the literature on
S/M suggests that people who practice S/M can experience a type of
nirvana. In "Closer," a song from 'gothic group Nine Inch Nails, the
song's narrator experiences himself through violating another. As
Lauren Goodlad explains, "The Other's physical pain takes the place
199 See id.
191 Justice Department Ponders Net•Based Serial Murders, NEWSBYTES, June 8, 2000 (quot-
ing Janet Reno as concerned about how to prosecute cyber-sex crimes).
192 See, e.g., Susan Jeanne Toepfer & Bryan Stuart Wells, The Worldwide Marko for Sex: A
Review of International and Regional Legal Prohibitions Regarding the Trafficking of Women, 2
Mien. J. GENDER & L. 83 (1994) (reviewing the International Treaty Law Prohibitions on
Trafficking in Women); Nora V. Demleitner, Forced Prostitution: Naming an International
Offense, 18 FORDIIAM INT'L L.J. 163 (1994) (reviewing the history of forced prostitution
and white slavery).
193 See In re Baby M., 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 1987) (contract for surrogate
void for public policy even though no statutory prohibition).
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of what he himself is incapable of feeling—his own reality: his dream
of getting closer to God."1" Thus, safe and consensual S/M in its purest
form really does not need to trouble the law.
Nevertheless, we simply do not know how many people who prac-
tice S/M play by the rules. Nor does everyone find that S/M brings
them "closer to God." People do sometimes regret consenting to a
sexual experience.'" True, the criminal law does riot punish people
for inflicting emotional harm, nor does it hold defendants strictly li-
able when someone experiences emotional ambivalence the "morn-
ing after." 196
 Rather, the criminal law protects a civilized society from
actual physical violence.
Where the law should draw the line between "love bites" and
criminal biting, for example, is a question that no one can definitively
answer. In one example, the Mary Albert case, the physical evidence
clearly showed that his accuser sustained bite marks and bruises on
her back.'" Mr. Albert eventually pled guilty to assault and battery.'"
But it is curious that even though he was charged with assault and bat-
tery, as well as sexual assault, the prosecution never argued that con-
sent was irrelevant to the issue of bite marks. Whether the prosecution
would have been able to successfully argue that one cannot consent to
"love bites" we will never know. The question remains whether this
type of injury sufficient to hold Albert strictly liable? Was the injury
itself is what one would reasonably expect from a sexual encounter?
Arguably yes. Did it cause the complainant to suffer serious bodily in-
jury? Arguably no. Yet, these questions were never put to a jury, and
thus we have very little gauge as to where community sentiment lies
on the question of how much violence is too much violence.
Admittedly, these cases will indeed be decided one at a time, and
courts will continue to struggle to decide the bounds of the law. But
better that law protect against amateurs and punish true sadists than
condone intimate violence. No doubt, there are far more people who
194 600W:id, supra note 23, at 38.
196 See Mark M. Hager, Sex in the Original Position: A Restatetnent of Liberal Feminism, 14
WIS. WOMEN'S Li. 181 (1999); see also Morrison Torrey, Feminist Legal Scholarship on Rape: A
Maturing Look at One Form of Violence Against Women, 2 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 35
(1995).
196 See generally KATIE ROPHI, THE MORNING AFTER (1993).
197 See Commonwealth of Virginia, Dep't of Crim. Just. Servs., Div. of Forensic Science,
Certificate of Analysis, Case No. 970212004 (Aug. 4, 1997) (bite marks on victim's back
matched Albert's DNA).
198 Sieve Ziplay, On the Road Back, Remorseful Mary Getting Counseling, NEwSDAY, Oct. 24,
1997.
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have been victimized by sexual violence than those who have been
held criminally culpable for engaging in safe, consensual S/M.
The argument that disallowing consent somehow stigmatizes
S/M and discourages people from exploring the bounds and bounda-
ries of power and powerlessness in their intimate relationships does
not seem to hold true in real life. As noted in the Introduction, the
practice of S/M is widespread and increasingly culturally acceptable.
There is no evidence that law enforcement is going around busting
sex clubs or setting up stings to crackdown on the practice, at least in
the United States. The Paddleboro case is the first reported of its kind
in the United States. To the contrary, law enforcement seems to look
the other way unless someone files a complaint or there is overwhelm-
ing evidence of physical injury. What is telling is not that there are so
many cases, but so few.
On a more practical note, it is extremely difficult to prosecute
cases where the participants have played by the rules. Without a com-
plaining witness, the state still requires evidence that there was, in
fact, an assault in order to meet its burden of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt. With the rare exception of videotapes or medical testi-
mony or a defendant's confession, truly safe and consensual S/M
cases are not likely to ever be pursued. States rarely prosecute cases of
domestic violence when the victim will not testify. 199 It seems highly
unlikely that many prosecutors will waste their time on cases with little
evidence, and where the harm is questionable at best. While this real-
ity certainly will not protect all defendants who might be singled out
by law enforcement because of their sexual orientation or their sexual
status, it does diminish the fear that the moral police could be all
powerful. Of course, were there to come a time when social currents
change and prosecutorial discretion becomes abused, we ought to
revisit the law But now, the data suggests that decriminalizing the in-
tentional infliction of criminal injury because it takes place within a
sexual context would create far more risk of injury, far more
glorification of violence and oppression, and many more victims.
To suggest that anyone should have the right to control, beat, or
brutalize another and escape culpability under a theory of sexual con-
sent violates our deepest notions of freedom, human rights, and civil-
ity. We have outlawed the most violent of sports and set clear rules for
organized competition. We now criminalize domestic violence and
° See Hanna, No Right to Choose, supra note 33, at 1898-1909 (describing the prosecu-
tion of domestic violence victims when the witness is unwilling to cooperate.).
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have expanded the definition of rape, thereby sanctioning violence
that takes place within the confines of a sexual relationship. The law
has evolved to set norms of civilized masculinity, and, increasingly,
civilized humanity.
Recent cases involving injury that results during an S/M encoun-
ter force us to stop at that crossroad between sex and violence. When
we ask in which direction the law ought to travel, it is clear from our
journey thus far that to follow the path of sexual autonomy will lead
us on the path to violence. While the sports exception to assault and
battery is embedded with its own set of cultural norms and values
about the benefit and inevitability of male aggression, at the very least
the law has sought to confine the detour from the doctrine of violent
consent. We can accept some intentional infliction of harm so long as
the path of the law is marked with rules and regulations and referees,
and where the power among the participants is relatively balanced.
But to allow the doctrine to detour at sex on the road to autonomy,
without the safeguards and protections and rules and referees intrin-
sic to sport, to veer off into an area where power imbalance between
the parties, be it physical or economic or social, is far too common, is
to travel dangerously close to violating notions of fundamental free-
dom and human rights. To follow the path of violence is to travel
backwards. Today, here in Zion, we remain free by staying in bondage
to the law.
